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The building of a "New World Order" presents the United States with novel opportunities and
problems. If the 21st century is to be the "Pacific Century," US-Japan relations will become the
cornerstone of US policy. The ongoing drawdown of US forces places a renewed emphasis on the
security relationship between the two countries. The United States has long desired an increase
in the security role played by Japanese military forces. In the wake of the Cold War and the Gulf
Crisis, Japanese opinion leaders are beginning to debate Japan's international security role. Within
the context of the debate, an increasingly visible group of opinion leaders, the Internationalists,
has emerged as the leading proponent of a greater Japanese security role. Their concept goes
beyond Peacekeeping Operations under United Nation auspices.
This thesis analyzes the security policy debate now occurring in Japan, with a special emphasis
placed on the Internationalists. This assessment provides American policy leaders with important
insights into the internal Japanese debate regarding Japan's probable new role in the Pacific.
An understanding of Japanese domestic policy debates is vital in order for the United States
to realize successfully her policy aims in the Asia-Pacific region. This study, sourced entirely from
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I . INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War and the Gulf War are two events
which have had a significant impact on the thinking of
Japanese scholars and analysts regarding the global and
regional role their country should take. This has generated
within the Japanese political right a debate between three
schools of thought: the Status Quo school, directed towards
maintaining Japan's current role and policies; a Neo
Nationalist school advocating a role completely autonomous
from the US; and a new Internationalist school which
encourages significant change in the way Japan acts in the
international arena, yet without leading to an autonomous
role
.
This thesis is an attempt to identify the contours,
dynamics, and proponents of an emerging Internationalist
school in Japanese foreign policy debates and assess its
impact on future Japanese foreign policy.
No longer content with the mere bankrolling of other
countries' development and tired of international criticism of
Japan's mercantilist foreign policy, the post-WWII generation
is attempting to forge out a new military and political role
for Japan that is commensurate with her economic stature.
Furthermore, the key for Japan to realize her expanded role
may lie in Southeast Asia. This is the core of the
Internationalist perspective.
Why should this be of importance to the US? Japan is the
United States' primary partner in the stability of the Asia-
Pacific theater. Up to now, the major policy makers in the
Japanese government have been the pre-WWII generation. These
Status Quo figures are beginning to be replaced by the younger
Internationalists. An excellent example is Japan's most-
recent search for a new Prime Minister. Of the three
candidates, two were older Status Quo politicians, but one
candidate, Liberal Democratic Party General Secretary Ichiro
Ozawa, was of the post-WWII Internationalist generation. As
the Internationalists start to assume power in Japan, it is
absolutely critical for the United States to recognize the
change and have a detailed understanding of the
Internationalists' foreign policy agenda.
Without understanding the motives behind the actions of
one of her primary partners, the United States cannot hope to
successfully realize her own policies. It is vital for the US
to be aware of the various opportunities and problems
presented by the possibility of Japan emerging in a new role
as potential Peacekeeper in the Asia-Pacific region.
During the past year, an active debate has taken place
within Japan regarding her security policy. Many politicians,
scholars, and academics are arguing that Japan needs to
shoulder a greater security role, not only within the confines
of Japanese territories and surrounding waters, but also in
the international arena. Although security policy has been a
subject of debate in Japan for the last twenty five years, the
recent debate is significant in that many leading politicians
have also joined in calling for a greater Japanese role.
Member of Parliament (MP) Ichiro Ozawa, reputed to be the
LDP's strongman, stated recently that Japanese troops should
be allowed to engage in combat under UN
auspices. [Ref. 1] Coming from a politician as
influential and well known as MP Ozawa, such a statement is
simply amazing, and would have been unthinkable a few short
years ago. Another major change is that an international role
outside of Japan's immediate territories and surrounding
waters, is being urged by many Japanese opinion leaders.
These changes will have a tremendous effect upon US policy
regarding Japan.
This study focuses mainly upon Japanese opinion leaders.
With the exception of Chapter IV, Japanese sources will be
primarily used. As noted in the bibliography, the exceptions
are used to outline the security environment confronting Japan
since 1965. While the majority of the sources are magazine
and journal articles originally published in Japanese and
subsequently translated into English, the study will also
consider articles published in English by Japanese writers.
Also falling into this category are articles co-authored by
Japanese writers.
As the objective is to synthesize Japanese opinion,
content analysis is the primary methodology utilized. The
limitations of this thesis are worth noting. First, the
author speaks Japanese but he cannot read Japanese fluently,
thereby restricting sources to translations. Second,
translated articles are known to be destined for foreign
readers, hence a bias may be present in the selection of
articles for translation in published sources. Third, some of
the translated articles are not complete translations.
Finally, as with all translations, some degree of error in
content and perspective must be assumed.
Chapter IV focuses upon several opinion leaders of
Southeast Asia. This chapter will serve to argue that the
people of Southeast Asia, if necessary, may now be willing to
permit a Japanese security role in their environs. Therefore,
articles published by their opinion leaders are the source of
information used there.
The study is organized in the following manner. First, the
evolution of Japan's security policy debate will be traced
from 1965 to the present. Second, and most important, the
current security policy will be addressed. Especially
significant is the section dealing with the Internationalist
school of thought. Third, the thoughts of other Asian opinion
leaders will be studied, as any moves on Japan's part to
increase her security role will be highly dependent upon the
understanding and support of her neighbors,
implications for US policy will be addressed.
Finally,
II. EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE SECURITY POLICY
The first question to consider is what is bringing about
changes in Japan's security policy debate? The answer lies in
the security environment surrounding Japan. More than
anything else, external factors drive Japan's security policy.
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the development of
Japan's security policy since 1965, and relate different
phases to external factors. The study will not focus upon
specific events and tie them to changes. Rather, the overall
security environment surrounding Japan has changed over the
years; and it is these broad, sweeping changes which force
Japan to adapt
.
The chapter is divided into four general phases. Starting
in 1965 with Japan's "coming out party," the Tokyo Olympics,
the phases are divided as follows. Phase I is entitled
"Security under Pax Americana," and lasts until the mid
1970's. The second phase, entitled "Detente and US Withdrawal
from Asia, " lasts from then until the 1980s. The third phase,
"Cold War Revisited" lasts for about five years following
that. The final phase, "Current Security Policy Debate", will
be examined in Chapter III.
A. PHASE I: SECURITY UNDER PAX AMERICANA
The first phase starts with the 1965 Tokyo Olympics. This
event broadcast to the world that Japan had taken her place
among the leading industrialized nations. First, the world
surrounding Japan must be examined. The US was the
overwhelmingly dominant factor in the region, and in Japan's
security picture. Safe as she was under the aegis of American
military and political might, Japan indulged in unrealistic,
theoretical debates over whether or not Japan should possess
any forces. Opposition parties questioned the legality of
having the Self Defense Forces. This Utopian period saw the
emergence of many "unarmed neutrality"
advocates, [Ref . 2] likening Japan to the
"Switzerland of the Orient." What most of these people
conveniently forgot is that Switzerland maintained her
neutrality by being very well armed.
Another factor which influenced Japan during this period
was US involvement in the Vietnam War. Many Japanese were
afraid of being drawn into that conflict by virtue of having
US forces in Japan. Hence, a great many advocates favored
distancing Japan from the US.
A look at various party platforms in 1966 regarding
security policy for Japan is indicative of this Utopian
period. [Ref. 3]
1. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
a. World Situation
Although Japan has developed a free
democracy , there are those within the country who would
destroy the system in order to accomplish a Communist
Revolution. Therefore, Japan's national security is very
susceptible to external menaces. The Communist camp has
greatly extended its influence in the world, not by virtue of
their economic or social theories, but by their skill and
coercion in elaborating strategies, tactics and organizing
techniques. Recent events, however, have demonstrated that
their totalitarian systems are difficult to achieve. One good
example is the Sino-Soviet rift. Both Communist China and the
Soviet Union have been approaching developing countries,
trying to force them to leave the Free World. So far, all
countries involved in the communist sphere have not succeeded
in achieving economic success. This is in severe contrast to
the Free World nations.
b. National Security
The peace and security of the world today is
maintained by the collective security system. Should Japan
turn towards a policy of neutrality, the entire system may be
endangered by the corresponding misbalance of power.
Especially dangerous is the concept of "unarmed neutrality."
Nowhere in the entire world does such a country exist. Should
Japan adopt such an unrealistic policy, the country, extremely
valuable but entirely defenseless, will be open to an attack
by an enemy and completely destroyed. In order to maintain
the security of the nation, the U.S/Japan Security Treaty must
be maintained, and the Self Defense Forces strengthened.
2. Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
a. World Situation
In the current international situation in Asia,
the United States is the imperialist power invading and
interfering by force. It is Communist China and the Soviet
Union that are real peace lovers. Japan's alliance with the
US leads to the danger of Japanese involvement in a war caused
by the US.
b. National Security
In the nuclear age, to state that one cannot
defend one's country emptyhanded will eventually lead to a
view admitting independent nuclear armament. Therefore, a
peace securing system not relying on military power is the
nation's security in the true sense of the world. The
U.S. /Japan Security Treaty should be immediately abrogated and
the Self Defense Forces, which are unconstitutional anyway,
will be liquidated (liquidated meaning its personnel will be
transferred to peaceful duties) . Japan will pursue a course
of international unarmed neutrality.
3. Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)
a. World Situation
The international situation in Asia is
intensifying in tension due to the activities of competing
camps seeking rival methods of establishing a world order in
the region. It is a war upon which the two sides are staking
the victory of their respective global policies.
b. National Security
The major point of Japan's security lies in how to
maintain Japan's peace and safety amidst such circumstances as
outlined above. For this purpose, two major steps will be
followed. First is the establishment of a " Self -Reliant
"
defense system achieved by halting the further expansion of
the Self Defense Forces, and reorganize them in the direction
of qualitative improvement of their functions. The US/ Japan
Security Treaty will be drastically reduced in scope, and the
US forces withdrawn from Japanese territories. The US forces
will be asked to return to Japan under a "stationing in
emergency" policy if required.
4. Komeito (CGP=Clean Government Party)
a. World Situation
The struggle for power among the United States,
Soviet Union, and Communist China is heightening the feeling
of tension in the international situation and Japan's attitude
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towards the US/Japan Treaty threatens to greatly influence the
peace of Japan.
b. National Security
The Komeito sticks to absolute pacifism,
advocating world racialism by which all the races of the world
are unified as one race, and peace and prosperity of a nation
are achieved without a sacrifice of any other nation. We
firmly insist that any international dispute will be solved by
a peaceful diplomatic means, never by military force. For
this purpose, therefore, we will endeavor to materialize a
total disarmament and a total abolition of nuclear arms,
strengthen the peace making functions of the U.N., maintain
the peace of the world by a permanent U.N. police force, and
establish a new world of absolute peace and without armament.
We will march towards world peace by enhancing the spirit of
the pacifist and democratic Constitution throughout the world.
5. Japan Communist Party (JCP)
a. World Situation
The JCP concludes that the socialist states
are peaceful forces and there is no danger of either Communist
China or the Soviet Union attacking Japan. However, Japan is





The JCP does not deny the right of self defense.
It rejects "unarmed neutrality" because an appropriate self
defense step is needed after the existing US/Japan security
system has been destroyed. The unconstitutional SDF serves
the US and oppresses the nation against the Constitution.
Therefore, it must be eliminated and a people's army created.
Overall, the various party platforms clearly show that
during this period, as long as Japan's external security was
assured by Pax Americana, the Japanese people found little
need to build and maintain a strong military force on its
own. [Ref. 4] Combined with this was the widespread
pacifist sentiment which resulted from the WWII
experience. [Ref. 5] A further complication was
caused by misgivings that should the US embark on a program of
"dangerous adventurism" in Asia, Japan would be drawn into the
conflict through the presence of US bases on her
soil. [Ref. 6] The US/Japan Security Treaty would act
as a "magnet." [Ref. 7] Therefore, for many
Japanese, the Utopian approaches outlined above had a strong
emotional appeal, and in such issues, emotions were stronger
than reason. [Ref. 8] However, an emotional over-
reaction to some shocking future event might change the
direction that Japan would take. [Ref. 9]
This was not long in coming.
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B. PHASE II: DETENTE AND US WITHDRAWAL FROM ASIA
The second phase begins with the Nixon shock over China
and was rapidly accelerated by the 1973 OPEC oil embargo.
These two events made it absolutely clear to Japan that she
could no longer rely wholeheartedly upon the US. The Nixon
shock pointed out that Japan really might be a inconsequential
junior partner in US eyes. The oil embargo brought home two
items. First, for all of the US military might, the oil
embargo still hit home. Second, the oil embargo made the
Japanese realize that for all of their industrial strength and
development, the country was extremely vulnerable. Perhaps a
better term would be resource dependent.
Also in 1975, the once unthinkable happened. The US
withdrew from Vietnam. No longer omnipotent, no longer
dauntless, the US was seen to be in decline. Even by the most
optimistic eyes, the US commitment to Asia seemed to be
waning. How much longer would Japan be seen as valuable
enough to protect? Was it valuable enough to protect? These
factors combined to bring about a turning point in the debate.
The focal point became: the best military posture for Japan to
assume. What should her defense policy actually be?
A look at period literature reveals the following
synopsis. In the 60 's, a younger and more pragmatic
generation of scholars who had studied in the US published
articles expressing approval of the security treaty and
emphasizing the necessity of the SDF . These were still in
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minority, however, with the majority of "idealists" urging
"unarmed neutrality." [Ref. 10] The 70 's were
characterized by a decrease in unarmed neutrality articles and
an increase in articles stressing necessity of national
defense. No clear cut consensus emerged,
however. [Ref. 11] The pacifist-radical coalition
that has supported the equation "rearmament equals militarism"
was disintegrating. [Ref. 12] Especially damaging
to the opposition parties advocating unarmed neutrality
(primarily the JSP) was a statement made to Japanese envoys by
Chairman Mao. Regarding the JSP:
They don't defend their own country. Only a
mentally deranged person would advocate unarmed neutrality
and the like. What a strange political party. [Ref. 13]
By this time the DSP had almost completely ridden itself
of Utopian pacifism. [Ref. 14] Pacifists were also
criticized
:
...in short, his comment would lead to the conclusion
that, because the Soviet Union is so powerful as to
possess nuclear subs, the Japanese had better hold up
their hands from the beginning, regardless of whether the
Soviet fleet dominates the Sea of Japan and haunts waters
adjacent to Japan. [Ref. 15]
MP Nakasone was especially critical of pacifists. Citing
an example where a judge ruled the Self Defense Forces as
unconstitutional and that citizens should defend themselves
with strikes or mass uprisings, he accused the judge of
exhorting people to go against machine guns with sticks. He
even pointed out that this advice is much worse than the WWII
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plan for Japanese citizens to attack allied forces with bamboo
spears. [Ref. 16]
By now, it was clear that the dream of turning Japan into
the "Switzerland of the Orient" was Utopian to a fault in that
it completely ignored the fact that Switzerland had been
maintaining its neutrality with heavy arms.
[Ref. 17] The Japanese people learned perhaps
their bitterest lesson from the oil crisis that rocked the
whole world in 1973. [Ref. 18] This awakened them
to the plain logic that the concept of selfish isolationism is
incompatible with the cause of national survival. The decline
in the popularity of the Socialist slogan of "unarmed
neutrality" in the 70 's is an eloquent indication that the
popular movement based on Utopian pacifism was on the
ebb. [Ref. 19] By now it was seen as only natural
that "we defend our own country
ourselves." [Ref. 20] Japan's proper course was
seen as that of a nation that possesses no nuclear arms but
focuses heavily on self defense. [Ref. 21]
The next item to consider is Japan's world context. To
some Japanese opinion leaders, the world surrounding Japan
could be characterized by Pax Russo-Americana . "It is an
undeniable fact that both powers wish at all costs to hold on
to the booty they captured at such enormous sacrifice during
WWII," [Ref. 22] This was complemented by the fact
that the current era was an age of discontinuity;
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characterized by major traumatic events such as the victory of
a small state (Vietnam) over a giant power (US) , and the
1973 oil crisis. [Ref. 23] The more the possibility
of direct intervention by the superpowers decreases, the
harder it is for them to restrain conflicts between or from
smaller powers. [Ref. 24] For some, the reason the US failed
in Vietnam was because it viewed the war simply in military
and technological contexts, and gave little thought to other
multiple factors hidden in the background. [Ref. 25]
Thus, some now came to believe that it would be wrong to view
the problem of national security for the 1970 's simply in the
context of military power. [Ref. 26]
The 1973 oil strategy by Arab states brought home to Japan
the fragility of the foundation of national life. A mere 25%
curtailment was enough to induce cries throughout Japan and
bring on indescribable panic. [Ref. 27]
Another factor was Japan's standing in US eyes . The debate
over US/Japan security system completely changed in nature as
a result of President Nixon's 1972 China visit and
normalization of relations between Japan and China in
September of that year. Chinese Premier Zhou criticized
"unarmed neutrality" and tended to support a limited
rearmament. The change in defense doctrine is also
attributable to Vietnam and President Carter's proposal to
withdraw US ground troops from Korea. [Ref. 28]
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Within this uncertain environment, Japan's position as an
industrial country of the processing-trading type, heavily
resource and energy intensive, now became a
weakness. [Ref . 29] Japan was completely under the US "food"
and "oil", in addition to nuclear,
umbrellas. [Ref. 30]
The next concept dealt with is actual defense policy for
Japan. Many interpret that Japan's acquisition of minimum
defense capability does not violate Article
9. [Ref. 31] Japan Defense Agency Director General
Nakasone launched a study aimed at self reliance in defense,
shifting from the former 1957 defense policy to a new one of
"self reliant defense with the US/Japan security system
playing a supplementary role." [Ref. 32]
One scholar argued that the highest priority of Japan's
defense policy ought to be placed on the formation of a
national consensus on defense. [Ref. 33] By 1977,
Japan's response to aggression consisted of (1) depending on
the US for nuclear deterrence, (2) securing US cooperation
against large scale conventional aggression, and (3) coping
with small scale aggression on its own. The question is
whether this response constituted adequate
deterrence. [Ref. 34]
Another stated that it was necessary for Japan, in
pondering its future security, to give priority consideration
to the economic aspects of the problem, including energy and
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food, as well as military problems. [Ref. 35] This
was comprehensive security. However, taking comprehensive
security measures does not justify putting too lov; a value on
defense capability or keeping defense capability to a
minimum. [Ref. 36]
In terms of this viewpoint, for Japan to be able to
continue its existence as a free country, it must, as the
first condition, protect its liberty and sovereignty as a
state. [Ref. 37] Japan needed strong leadership
and needed to create a balance between political will and
defense capability. [Ref. 38] The defense might be present,
but political will was still a carry over from post war days.
Without a proper balance between will and means, defense
capability could not serve the end of
deterrence. [Ref. 39]
JDA Director Nakasone's policy took some missions over
from the US, for example the high seas interception of
enemies. This was seen by some as a step in the "right"
direction. [Ref. 40]
Kaoru Murakami, a noted military commentator, stated that
in his opinion, maintenance of defense capability on an
appropriate level - neither excessive nor deficient - would be
Japan's trump card. [Ref. 41] He believed that
Japan ought to "do its best" at once to ensure regional
security first. And to this end, Japan must push the
following diplomatic strategy:
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• Continue to maintain the US/Japan pact
• Strictly maintain a neutral stance regarding both the
PRC and the USSR
• Exert immediate efforts to ease tensions on the Korean
Peninsula
Of these, most important to Japan is the Korean
peninsula. [Ref. 42]
The US/Japan security treaty was vital to Japan's
security. Had it not been for the security pact, it is
doubtful whether the Japanese could have maintained the "Peace
Constitution" without modification; and a ceiling on national
defense expenditures pegged at less than one percent of the
GNP would not have been a topic of debate. [Ref. 43]
However, it was an "undeniable fact" that the security pact
had destroyed the Japanese people's spirit of independence and
resistance, the most vital requirement of national defense, by
sheltering them with the American military
presence. [Ref. 44]
Finally, a conflict on the Korean peninsula was seen as a
grave danger. In order to prevent such a situation from
arising, it was seen as imperative to keep the military
strengths of both North and South Korea well balanced, and to
this end, the best thing to do would be to ask the US to
continue maintaining troops in South
Korea. [Ref. 45],
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Yet another issue, directly connected to the Korean
problem, was how to cooperate with the PKO of the
UN. [Ref. 46]
Relations with the United States were directly responsible
for the relative stability of the Korean peninsula, and
therefore to Japanese security. Only US military might under
the security treaty can serve as an effective deterrent to
war. [Ref. 47] The US, however, can never hope to fulfill its
responsibility in keeping armed forces stationed in ROK
without the cooperation of Japan, which functions as an
important rear supply and logistics base. [Ref. 48]
Although the US/Japan treaty may primarily be one of the
main pillars of the US strategy in the Far East, it also
serves the interests of Japan, possibly even better than those
of the US. [Ref. 49] The treaty is of immense importance to
Japan militarily as well. Basically speaking, Japan's defense
capability is not aimed at delivering any fatal blows to the
enemy. [Ref. 50] The treaty is critical in
offsetting this deficiency. Having a treaty also implies
responsibility along with any benefits. Japan must adhere to
the Japan-US security pact in order to fulfill her
responsibility as a co-partner in mutual security within the
framework of the Constitution. [Ref. 51]
Why is the treaty so beneficial to Japan? For one, the
treaty kept the Soviet Union from using military power to
"Fmlandize" Japan. It also served to deter Japanese
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involvement in the Sino-Soviet confrontation, which it could
not have afforded to do. [Ref. 52] The Self
Defense Forces (SDF) were also a critical part of Japan's
defense policy. During this era, the majority of the Japanese
public recognized the need for the existence of the Self
Defense Forces. [Ref. 53] However, the SDF, at this
time, had major defects. Tomohisa Sakanaka, editorial
committee member of the Asahi Shimbun, wrote several articles
which severely criticized the composition of the SDF. His
primary arguments are as follows. Japan must have the
capability to discourage an enemy from invading Japan or
obstructing her interests. [Ref. 54] The SDF did
not have the required capabilities. First, the SDF, while
supposedly stressing instant reaction capability, actually
did not possess that capability. Personnel shortages,
combined with extremely limited ammunition stockpiles, made
this a farce. Second, the relative lack of reserves meant
that replenishment for combat troops was limited. Finally,
there was no coordination between the three service branches.
This left tremendous gaps in defense which could be easily
exploited by an invading enemy. In his own words, "One can
conclude that the SDF are actually a form of collateral to
secure American commitment under the security
treaty." [Ref. 55]
He was not the only critic. Even a scholar in the arts
was sufficiently concerned to write an essay submitted to Chuo
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Koron, the principle magazine of scholarly debate in Japan.
In it, Tsuneari Fukuda states that it would not be easy for
Japan to hold out against an attack for even two weeks, much
less two or three months, as "current doctrine"
required. [Ref. 56] Perhaps it is only natural
that from the standpoint of the unity and consistency of the
defense set up, the complementarity of the US and Japanese
forces became very important. [Ref. 57]
Kaoru Murakami had the following solutions to correct the
deficiencies of both Japanese defense policy and the SDF
.
First, the formation of Japanese alliances with Pacific basin
countries was "absolutely essential" in order to strengthen
Japan's say in the international arena. [Ref. 58]
Second, Japan must follow a more responsible economic policy,
instead of just merely maximizing profits or cutting costs for
Japan. This was to maintain, if not increase, the number of
"friends" Japan had in the international arena. Third, the
National Defense Council must be strengthened. He points out
that basic understanding of the defense issue is absent at all
levels of the Japanese people, from Diet members to high
school students. There were too many restrictions governing
and limiting the activities of the SDF, which also severely
curtailed realistic training. He attributes this state of
affairs to the Defense Council, an advisory organ to the Prime
Minister, being unable to discuss defense policy. Rather, it
concentrated on such "nuts and bolts" affairs best handled
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directly by the Defense Agency. Third, the SDF concentrated
on upgrading capabilities by buying up the newest and most
expensive weapons systems, ignoring the necessities of a high-
low mix which would permit a greater stockpiling of munitions.
Fourth, Japan lacked a suitable surveillance system, as
evidenced by the relative ease with which a defecting Soviet
pilot was able to land at Hakodate Airport. Fifth, Japan
needed a stockpile of oil and food, at least six months worth.
Finally, standardized weaponry was needed. [Ref. 59]
From the preceding paragraphs, it becomes clear that
events had indeed changed the course of Japanese security
policy and thought. No longer encapsulated in an ideal world
ensured by Pax- Americana, Japan discovered that she needed a
realistic defense policy. At the same time, the US could not
be relied upon completely. Therefore, it was evident that
Japan had to take some step on her own.
C. PHASE III: COLD WAR REVISITED
This brings the study to the third period. A look at
Japan's world reveals the following. 1978 heralded the start
of a major increase in Soviet Pacific Fleet surface
combatants, with the first addition of a major surface
combatant, a cruiser, in many years. This was a major shift
from the former, submarine centered force strategy. A task
group centered around a Kiev class carrier was added to the
Pacific fleet in 1979. Within the next two years, two more
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cruisers and another carrier task force were added. This
increased the surface strength of the fleet by about
150%. [Ref. 60] The increase in numbers was
augmented by more significant qualitative improvements
represented by the new ships.
This shift in fleet concentration and the rapid growth
suggested a major shift in Soviet naval policy, away from a
relatively defensive policy aimed at basic survival. The
Pacific Fleet was no longer oriented solely around submarines,
but now developed a capacity for establishing naval presence
and projection of power beyond coastal waters. Especially
alarming was a substantial increase in purely offensive
forces, namely the increase of amphibious landing capacity
from three LST's to ten LST's and one LPD.
This buildup continued throughout the early 1980 's and was
readily apparent to the Japanese. Period literature focuses
upon this buildup, as evidenced by the synopsis presented
below.
The Soviet Pacific Fleet seems to be in a transition
period, undergoing a change from a coastal defense force to an
offensive ocean fleet in view of the configuration of its
bases being built in the Far East. The Russians will continue
their efforts to place the Sea of Japan under their control as
long as Vladivostok continues to be the homeport of the Soviet
Pacific Fleet. A well known fact is that the Russians have
long made strenuous efforts to acquire exits to warm waters.
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During the OKEAN 75 exercise, it was clearly evident that the
mission of the Soviet Pacific Fleet was to destroy air bases
on the US West coast, deal a blow to US naval power in the
Pacific, and neutralize Japan. The disposition of ships in
the exercise was designed to attack ships carrying food and
petroleum to Japan and sink USN vessels protecting the sea
lanes. As long as Japan depends on marine transportation of
petroleum, food, and natural resources, the Russians will have
life and death power over the Japanese by securing command of
the seas around Japan. [Ref. 61]
Accordingly, the SDF branches that need greater strength
are the maritime and air forces. Unless the Soviet Pacific
Fleet reinforcement is matched by Japanese capability, SDF's
deterrent effect will diminish. Once the American prop is
gone, Japan's freedom on the high seas will be severely
curtailed. [Ref. 62]
Murakami pointed out the dangers to Japan should North
Korea somehow forcibly unify the Korean Peninsula, and threw
the doors open to the Soviets. According to him, if the
Soviet fleet frequented Pusan, it could turn the Sea of Japan
into a Soviet lake, and also secure a crucial gateway to the
Pacific Ocean. Should Pusan be captured, hostile jets could
reach Kyushu in five minutes. [Ref. 63]
Soviet buildup of ground forces on Kunashiri and Etorofu
also contributed to the feeling of alarm. Soviet military
activity also increased. In 1981, 360 Soviet naval vessels
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passed through the Sea of Japan. In 1982, the JASDF had to
scramble 929 times to counter territorial violations by Soviet
military aircraft. The Soviet Union also demonstrated a
relative lack of concern for the sovereignty of smaller
nations in adjacent areas, as exemplified by the 1984 downing
of KAL 007. Combined with the previous track record set by
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, these events focused the
attention of the Japanese public to the military buildup and
increased a feeling of insecurity in the face of it.
By 1984, the Soviet Pacific Fleet had become the largest
of the four Russian fleets. Size was not the only significant
element. Whereas the Pacific Fleet used to consist of second
rate units with inferior equipment, it had by then become the
recipient of the latest ships and equipment
.
More important than the fleet itself are the perceived
underlying motives. The dramatic rise in Soviet naval forces
can be linked to the opportunity to fill the power vacuum, as
mentioned in a previous section, left by the decline of US
naval strength in the area, and to establish a dominant Soviet
influence in the area. As Soviet economic influence on Japan
was "minimal," the Soviet buildup, combined with use of bases
in Vietnam, gave the Soviet Union the potential to exert
leverage along the sea lanes vital to the Japanese economy.
By establishing a credible sea denial capability, the Soviet
Union created a potent weapon which is of overpowering
strength if a target nation's economy has a heavy reliance
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upon maritime commerce. Without a countering force, Soviet
naval presence, with its threat towards sea lanes, could force
a maritime nation to accept Soviet demands in order to
preserve their economies. Japan had just undergone a soul
searching realization into just how vulnerable her economy
really was, and then was faced with this buildup.
Perhaps the best summarization of the above is expressed
in the Japan Defense Agency's White Paper. Below are the
findings
:
1. Soviet naval and air forces now possess a potentially
formidable threat to sea transport routes connecting
Japan with the United States and with its sources of oil




Soviet access to bases in Vietnam has provided the Soviet
Pacific Fleet with a greater operational range in the
Indian Ocean and near the Southeast Asian Straits
connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
3. Air force modernization and the construction of new
airfields in eastern Siberia and Sakhalin give the USSR
impressive air attack capabilities against the Japanese
home islands
.
4. Soviet military support of client governments in Vietnam,
Angola, and Ethiopia demonstrated a growing ability and
willingness to intervene militarily in the Third World.
5. Amphibious landing capabilities have emerged in the
Soviet Pacific Fleet and may represent the beginning of
a long term effort to develop a greater capability.
6. The expansion of Moscow's political influence in East
Asia is a key motive behind the Soviet military buildup.
The assertion of military power gives the USSR greater
leverage in dealing with client states like Vietnam. It
forces noncommunist states in the region to take the
Soviets into greater account in their formulation of
foreign policy.
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How did this buildup affect Japanese vulnerability? Of
special concern is that the USSR concentrated its growth upon
maritime and air forces rather than ground forces. The USSR
has "always" had an impressive array of ground forces in the
area, but these forces were mostly directed at the PRC . Naval
and air forces are aimed towards another objective, one which
boded ill for Japan. The key lies in Japan's geographic
position
.
Japan lies between the USSR and the open ocean. Hence, it
has a potential capability to bottle up Soviet forces in the
Sea of Japan. [Ref. 64] Consequently, the Soviets
saw Japan as a potential hazard.
The blocking off works in both directions. The hostile
nature of the interior territories, combined with the
inability of the Trans-Siberian railway to support the amount
of commerce required, makes the Soviet sea lines of
communication vital to Soviet growth in the Far East. Japan
provides a significant barrier to this traffic which travels
via the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific because all of
this traffic must pass through one of the three straits: Soya;
Tsugaru; or Tsushima. Therefore, solely through virtue of its
location, Japan carries the dual menace of blocking supplies
to the area, and keeping the Soviet fleet bottled up in the
Japan Sea. For these reasons, the Soviet Union had a heavy
interest in Japan's military capability, and its own
capability to ensure that Japan will not dare take such
28
actions as outlined above. The best way to accomplish this is
to develop sufficient sea denial capability in the area and
hold Japan's economy hostage to ensure Japanese inaction.
For the Japanese, Japan's geographic situation also raised
concern for defense planners, especially in the light of
Soviet power composition. Japan is a densely populated island
nation located close to the Asian continent. Therefore, it
has the following vulnerabilities. Japan's proximity to the
mainland makes it vulnerable to air attack from mainland Asia.
This is compounded by her extreme demographic density and
concentration. Because of its mountainous formation, her
population and industrial centers are concentrated along very
narrow coastal zones. This extremely congested nation is
sustained by an increasingly complex system of transportation
and communication networks. The whole nation can be likened
to a mammoth exposed precision mechanism interconnected by
sensitive joints and delicate links. To top it off, Japan's
narrow island formation gives it very short depth in defense.
Relatively modest air attacks could easily destroy Japan's
vital industrial centers. [Ref. 65] On the other
hand, if Japan could somehow cope with airborne threats, the
span of her territories would provide an unlimited depth in
defense if Japan could control the ocean that extends at its
south side, thereby providing immense SLOC defense.
The SLOCs are also vital to Japan's survival. Japan
imports most of its raw materials, the most important of which
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is oil, and imports a very high percentage of her consumed
resources. Thus, Japan's SLOCs are a virtual lifeline for
Japan and the collapse of Japan could be brought about by
their sustained disruption.
For the above reasons, the long range goal of Japan's
defense planners would seem to be making Japan strong enough
to defend its skies and territorial waters, and at the same
time protect its SLOCs. To do so by herself would be
prohibitively expensive.
In such an environment, perhaps it is only natural that
Japanese security debate focused upon how to complement the US
military power. Japan alone cannot stand up against the might
of the Soviet Union. Even the capability to defend the
vitally important SLOCs can be questioned, and further
capability in this arena was encouraged.
It appeared that Japan could no longer totally depend upon
the United States. Therefore, the solution would appear to be
bolstering the US as much as possible. This is the theme
underlying the debate during the first half of the 1980's.
Policies set by two consecutive Prime Ministers underscore
this perception. In 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki agreed to
Japan undertaking the defense of her SLOCs for 1000 nautical
miles. In 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone proposed making Japan
into an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the US. More
significant, for the purposes of this study, is the debate in
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the scholarly journals. A synopsis of the debate is presented
next .
In 1980, the Japanese government tried to shift from a
"basic defense power" concept to a new defense concept
designed to counter the Soviet threat. [Ref. 66]
For the first time, Japan expressed solidarity with the US by
denouncing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [Ref. 67] Up
to now, Japan had delayed paying its burdensharing costs as
long as possible and devoted itself to creating a future world
order during this indeterminate grace
period. [Ref. 68]
According to Nagai Yonosuke, professor at the Tokyo
Institute of Technology, the name of the game in politics
today is not power but influence. To him, arms are nothing
but a means of bargaining power. [Ref. 69]
During this period, various defense plans were being
unveiled, officially and not, and in all was the supposition
of the Soviet Union as the most serious threat, other than
another oil crisis. [Ref. 70] It is virtually
impossible for Japan's 118 million people to survive on
nothing more than their own efforts and the nation's own land
and resources. [Ref. 71] Nagai stated that the
cardinal point in counter-Soviet defense is to not allow the
Soviet Union to harbor any intention of invading Japan. His
concept would have two elements: enable the Soviet Union to
make full use of Japan's economic and technological strength
31
through mutually beneficial relationships in trade relations,
and economic and technological cooperation; and (more
significant for the purposes of this study) by making the cost
of invading Japan too high. In his opinion, Japan must not be
defeated. It must possess the capability to resist invasion
for at least three months. She needs capability to repel and
endure an attack. At the same time, Japan must not launch a
preemptive attack on the Soviet Union (to avoid provocation)
,
and adhere to a "strictly defensive" posture. Japan's
advantage lies in being defensive. Moral advantage, combined
with technological advances in weaponry, would offset the
weakness of the defending Japanese side. Nagai does not like
pacifists, either. He states that those who say that Japan
might as well give up defense of sea lanes is too expensive
are looking at the unsuitable (for Japan) examples of
Switzerland, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan.
Nagai ' s policy for the future was as follows:
Japan's concept of defense in the narrow sense must focus
on an exclusively defensive stance based on the theory of
asymmetric conflict:
• merge all 3 services
• improved C3
• strengthen Japanese denial power (against invasion)
• achieve technological prowess in high technology
• join the UN peacekeeping operations
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•establish a "moral equivalent to
conscription. [Ref . 72]
Masatake Okumiya, ASDF Lieutenant General and noted
historian, wrote an article emphasizing the need for Japan to
protect her SLOCs . [Ref. 73] In it he stated that
if, through future efforts, Japan is able to strengthen its
ability to protect the sea lanes in its vicinity, then there
is every hope that this will leave more of the US forces free
for assignment to the protection of sea lanes farther away.
Thanks to the combined strength of Japan's SDF and the
US/Japan treaty, the security of the sea lanes around Japan
have been maintained without the Japanese peoples' awareness.
It is high time the people recognized that Japan should
possess a defense capability appropriate to its national
strength. It cannot be repeated too often that the security
of the country's sea lanes is vital even in peacetime. Those
who remember or are acquainted with Japan's World War II
experience under the US blockade, and believe that history
proves just how difficult it is to provide maritime protection
may have a point when they put forward the argument that
defending sea lanes is unnecessary or even impossible.
However, it is not appropriate simply to use these facts alone
as a basis for arguing about the present and the future.
After all, Britain succeeded, albeit at great cost, in keeping
open its shipping lanes in the Atlantic during both World Wars
with the cooperation of the US and other countries. The
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security of the SLOCs must be
maintained. [Ref. 74] In the opinion of another
scholar, the Japanese have forgotten that as a trading nation,
Japan benefitted more than any other country, from free trade
principles. [Ref. 75]
Strengthening the international security system calls for
closer consultation between Washington and its
allies. [Ref. 76] This does not mean Japan blindly
following a US lead, however. If Japan intends to increase
defense capabilities under such an alliance, it should do so
more as a reinforcement of its autonomy rather than
strengthening its posture of "plunging" toward the
US. [Ref. 77] The 1983 "unsinkable carrier"
statement provoked an angry Soviet response. In order to avoid
this vicious circle in the future, Japan must prepare
independent initiatives in foreign affairs, not relying
excessively on US military might for national
security. [Ref. 78]
Nagai states that national security is the state of
affairs in which the crisis that would necessitate the
sacrifice of a country's core values is
avoided. [Ref. 79] The maintenance of a collective
security system, with the US/Japan security treaty at the
core, and a friendly relationship with the Western countries
are of paramount importance in Japan's defense against the
Soviet Union. [Ref. 80] Kuriyama Takakazu, an
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official at the treaties bureau at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, feels that it is necessary for the industrial
democracies of the West to submerge minor differences for the
sake of greater common interests. [Ref. 81]
Recognizing that the further expansion of Soviet Union in
Southwest Asia and the Middle East is a major threat, Japan
and other Western countries need to work out countermeasures
while adjusting policies under US leadership. Japan's policy
should have the following elements 1) aid to promote
stability; 2) steps to promote Soviet self restraint; 3)
deployment of necessary military strength . [Ref. 82]
Up to now, by espousing such ideas as unarmed neutrality,
a 1% GNP cap on military spending, and singleminded
concentration on economic development, Japan's foreign policy
has lacked international common sense. It is a mature Japan's
international responsibility to stop behaving in defiance of
international common sense. [Ref. 83] Japan needs
support in international opinion. Therefore, it must make
diplomatic efforts to avoid being
isolated. [Ref. 84] Japan is already viewed
internationally as a nation with special characteristics, and
if its foreign affairs officials were to continue stressing
these, Japan would have no alternative but to tread a path
leading to diplomatic isolation. [Ref. 85]
Kuriyama further states that in order for Japan to
fulfill its responsibilities within a cooperative system among
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industrial democracies, with close US/Japan relations as
cornerstone of foreign policy, is to choose the path of an
active peace-oriented foreign policy that is now called
for. [Ref. 86] However, as Sase Masamori, a
professor at the National Defense Academy, points out, the
idea that the military element can be removed from a
relationship between nations referred to as an alliance goes
against international common sense. [Ref. 87]
Sase goes on to say that it is a fact that where national
security is concerned, there are certain situations in which
only military measures are of any use. Japanese leaders have
been reluctant to accept this relatively simple
fact. [Ref. 88] Kuriyama feels that the only option open for
Japan is for Japan and Europe alike to build a system of
cooperation among the industrial democracies while maintaining
solidarity with the US through a more balanced sharing of
international responsibilities. [Ref. 89]
Kaoru Murakami favors an arms buildup. According to him,
a nation's security depends on a combination of diplomacy,
economic cooperation, economic policy, and defense, with
defense being the last resort. [Ref. 90]
Some would even advocate doing away with the three
nonnuclear principles in the interest of national security.
"The idea that Japan wants national security and its 3
nonnuclear principles, especially the non introduction clause
as applying to the US Navy, will never be understood by the
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outside world because it violates international common
sense. " [Ref . 91]
Another author, Kunihiro Masao, believes that Japan should
adapt to its present environment by using its economic and
technological might in the development of what he calls "the
moral equivalent of military power" . If Japan fails to do so,
the Japanese perception of Japan as a superpower, prompting
pretensions to being a political and military power, could
isolate Japan in the international arena. That is why the
Japanese cannot afford to delay. [Ref. 92] In
short, Japan should use its economic power and advanced
technology unstintingly in an effort to realize the goal of
peace, in accordance with its
Constitution. [Ref. 93] The Japanese must clearly
recognize the place of military strength in the context of
comprehensive security. [Ref. 94] Finally, the very
conclusion of the US/Japan treaty can be seen as signifying
recognition of the right of collective self
defense. [Ref. 95]
Regarding the military aspect of comprehensive security,
the consolidation of Japan's own defense capability takes on
a new meaning. This is Japan's responsibility under the
US/Japan security treaty.
As US responsibility for the rest of the world increases,
Japan's assumption of the minimum necessary responsibility of
its own defense has become necessary for the peace of the
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world as a whole. It is essential that Japan realize the
importance of strengthening its defense capability from this
viewpoint as well.
In conclusion, according to Kuriyama, Japan has always
borne its share of responsibility in encouraging the growth of
a free and open economic system. Since the US can no longer
be expected to bear the entire burden of preserving world
peace and defending Japan's security, the separation of
political and economic considerations will no longer pass
muster internationally. Peace and security under a democratic
system can only be protected by combining forces with the US
and other industrial democracies with similar goals. There is
no need to blindly follow the US. However, security is
expensive. The best way to minimize costs is to share the
responsibility of security with other Western
countries. [Ref. 96]
Japan must realize that the US' distorted "free ride"
perception will be curbed only when Japan abandons its self
indulgent attitude and demonstrates its willingness to fulfill
its responsibilities as an ally. [Ref. 97] Japan
must consider ways to respond to US expectations in order to
maintain friendly relations between the two
nations. [Ref. 98]
During this timeframe, articles in the monthly magazines




, which once carried many articles advocating
unarmed neutrality, now printed only a few essays calling for
the abolition of the SDF and US/Japan security
treaty. [Ref. 100] The Japanese people came to
accept the security treaty. [Ref. 101] A period
survey showed, insofar as it is reliable, that the majority
of Japanese favored defense through the SDF and US/Japan
security treaty while opposing Constitutional
revision. [Ref. 102]
One scholar bemoaned the fact many people in Japan tended
to wishfully interpret the US/Japan security treaty in a way
favorable to Japan. [Ref. 103] They appeared to
believe that although the US is demanding that Japan increase
its defense capability, even if Japan refused to do so, the US
will take up the slack, albeit reluctantly. To support their
assertion, they point to the vast sums the US has invested in
Japan. He does not think this generosity would last
forever. [Ref. 104]
Prime Minister Suzuki, in an 1981 Japan-US joint
communique, stated that:
Japan, on its own initiative and in accordance with
its Constitution and basic defense policy, will seek to
make even greater efforts for improving its defense
capabilities in Japanese territories and in its
surrounding sea and air space, and for further alleviating
the financial burden of US forces in
Japan. [Ref. 105]
Many scholars agreed with this statement, and advocated a
reinterpretation of the security treaty in order to facilitate
39
the aims stated therein. It is only natural that there should
be changes in the way the treaty is implemented after it had
been in force for over 20 years. The US/Japan security treaty
is just one of many treaties. As has been demonstrated
countless times in the past, a treaty maintains its
effectiveness so long as there is a rough parity of interests
between the two parties concerned. [Ref . 106]
Japan was running the risk of alienating its treaty partner.
This situation must be rectified.
The world had changed for the US, too. The US, based on
Pax Americana, was apt to consider leadership as unilaterally
defining what is best for the world and expecting other
countries to follow suit . Kuriyama argued that Japan and other
Western countries must point out to the US the difference
between unilateral action and leadership. [Ref. 107]
This returns to the point of ensuring an independent
foreign policy for Japan. As mentioned earlier, in 1983,
Prime Minister Nakasone visited the US and emphasized the
importance of close US-Japan ties. The most controversial
point during his US visit was the fact that he set forth a
policy of reinforcing the US/Japan military alliance.
According to Tokyo University professor Igarashi Takeshi, the
Japanese must keep a careful watch to see whether this policy
is compatible with Japan's peaceful national ideals. If
Nakasone really intends to make Japan into an "unsinkable
aircraft carrier", the Japanese may have to say farewell to
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the peace loving state. The most disappointing aspect of
Nakasone's trip to the US is that he made no effort to put
across Japan's peace loving ideals. The US public may see
Nakasone's statements as meaning Japan is no longer serious
about realizing the ideals of a peace loving nation, and
therefore increase demands for a buildup of Japan's defense
capability on the grounds of the US/Japan military
alliance. [Ref. 108]
One possible source of Japan's bargaining power may lie in
the apparent inconsistency of being a lightly armed,
nonnuclear economic power. The awareness of other countries
of the possibility of Japanese rearmament might serve as a
bargaining point because it deters other countries from
exerting pressure on Japan to rearm
heavily. [Ref. 109]
To summarize this phase, it can be said that because Japan
discovered that the threat facing her was so overwhelming, the
only hope for Japan's survival lay in bolstering as much as
possible the US. There was simply no way Japan could cope on
her own. The zenith of this trend of thought is perhaps
represented by Yatsuhiro Nakagawa . He believed that the best
thing Japan could do was to encourage the formation of a
Western Pacific Treaty Organization (WEPTO) , based upon and
ancillary to, NATO. The interim solution would be to form an
US/Japan/ROK alliance until such a major step could be taken.
In short, for this school, the best solution for Japan to
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pursue was to adapt immediately the Western system of
collective security. [Ref. 110]
This concept permeated the debate of the period. However,
a underlying condition was that Japan should do so of her own
volition, not because the US desired her to.
This brings the study the next chapter, which focuses upon
Phase IV, New World Order and the current security policy
debate in Japan.
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Ill PHASE IV: NEW WORLD ORDER AND CURRENT SECURITY POLICY
DEBATE
Two events in 1990, the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the Gulf War, have served to intensify the ongoing security
policy debate among Japanese opinion leaders. Another factor
is the perceived decline of the United States. Given that the
U.S - Japan relationship is a key part of Japan's security
policy, many are stating that this bilateral relationship
needs to be altered. Especially significant is the debate
surrounding the U.S. Japan security relationship. The purpose
of this chapter is to look at an emerging school of thought,
the Internationalist school, regarding Japan's new security
role and her relations with the United States.
The chapter is organized in the following manner. First,
two other schools of thought, the Status Quo and Neo
Nationalist schools, will be briefly defined and discussed.
Second, the Internationalist school will be presented, along
with its views on the dangers of continuing current policies
and its proposal for a new security role for Japan. Finally,
internationalist thoughts on revising the U.S. Japan Mutual
Security Treaty will be discussed.
It is important to realize that the Internationalist
school is on the political right in Japan. The three schools
presented here represent a relatively recent, pronounced
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division in the political right. Alternative schools of
thought have always been present on the left
.
A. STATUS QUO
The reason the study identifies the first school as status
quo is that these intellectuals see the maintenance of Japan's
reliance upon the U.S. for security as the best option for
Japan to pursue, thereby maintaining the current status quo
between the U.S. and Japan. This extension of the Yoshida
doctrine is the majority view, not only in Japanese
government, but also among the public. [Ref. Ill]
Opinions characteristic of this school are: any security
moves on Japan's part will be the bare minimum necessary to
keep the U.S. engaged, and to deflect "gaiatsu", or foreign
pressure; and continued reliance upon the principles of
comprehensive security, less flatteringly referred to as neo-
mercantilism. Comprehensive security, or soqo anzen hosho , is
"that policy which puts greater emphasis on economic and
diplomatic means than on military means for pursuing the
nations security." [Ref. 112] Any increases in Japan's
security role will be limited to nonmilitary dimensions of its
comprehensive security policy. [Ref. 113] Military
dimensions of Japan's security policy will in all probability
be limited to the territories of Japan and its 1000-mile
defense perimeter. [Ref. 114] For the near term,
the alliance between the United States and Japan, an
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"insurance policy," [Ref. 115] is the best way to
a global security system. [Ref. 116] Maintaining
some US forces in Japan serves the interests of both nations,
and proves a military and political link understood by both
friend and foe. [Ref. 117] Regarding Japan's
security role, its most important security task is to help the
United States remain a Pacific power by increasing support for
stationing US troops in Japan. [Ref. 118] As for
its extraregional security role, Japan should provide
personnel for UN peacekeeping operations and monetary
contributions commensurate with its economic power. [Ref. 119]
Perhaps the Japanese bureaucracy is the best advocate of this
status quo viewpoint
:
Japanese security policy is formulated and
implemented largely by these three major ministries
operating along two axes. On questions of economic
security, MITI, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs are the core in which Japanese policy
is articulated. On questions of military security the
central bureaucratic organizations are the Ministry of
Fiance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Defense
Agency. While an informal inter ministerial coordination
routinely takes place between both areas of security
policy, distinctive institutional arrangements affecting
issues of military security assure that political and
economic perspectives retain paramount importance in
national security policy making . [Ref. 120]
This brings the study to the next school of thought.
B. NEO NATIONALIST
The next alternative school is the Neo Nationalist school.
This school maintains that Japan should pursue a "completely"
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independent policy from the U.S. Summarized broadly, these
opinion leaders want Japan to discard the U.S. -Japan security
alliance, the war renouncing Constitution, and to build up an
independent defense capability. They are immensely confident
in the strength of Japan's technology and economy to keep the
world at bay, hence the name Neo-Nationalist
.
Most prominent among this group is MP Shintaro Ishihara.
In his book, The Japan That Can Say No , he states that the
current military posture of Japan is a direct result of U.S.
desires, and not one which is suited for the defense of Japan:
By shaping Japan's armed forces according to a U.S.
strategic plan, Washington was able to demonstrate its
military might and that it would be a reliable ally.
Japan's flawed security policy is the result of four
decades of acquiescent diplomacy. Our leaders have gone
along with Washington on everything. It would be less
expensive to defend ourselves than to continue the present
arrangement with the United States. We have subordinated
our security interests to America's global strategy and
pay much of the cost of maintaining their forces in
Japan." [Ref. 121]
Regarding the security treaty, he has the following to say:
It is time a Japanese Prime Minister said "We will
protect ourselves with our own strength and wisdom. " This
will entail certain sacrifices. Although not yet
politically feasible, with a popular consensus, we could
do it. We have the technological and fiscal resources for
an independent, defensive military force. I am not
suggesting we abrogate the security treaty immediately.
That is not realistic. Our relationship with the United
States is of fundamental importance and we owe much to the
treaty. My point is that to rule out this possibility-not
even to think about it-deprives us of an important
bargaining chip. Today, the security treaty is no longer
indispensable. We have sufficient resources to maintain
the present level of defense capability on our own. Both
the left and right in Japan become so emotional about the
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security alliance that a reasoned national debate on the
issue has been impossible. Like it or not, however,
before long we will have to reassess the pact and make a
decision. [Ref. 122]
What sort of military posture should Japan adopt, then?
The answer to this lies in another article written by MP
Ishihara regarding the FSX controversy. In it, he states:
But surely a cheaper and more effective defense, one that
could prevent an enemy from landing, would deploy numerous
high-speed, missile equipped vessels along the coast...
A
fundamental review of our defense philosophy is needed as
quickly as possible. [Ref. 123]
MP Ishihara apparently sees the direct defense of the
Japanese homeland as the only defense requirement Japan should
possess. His viewpoint had been widely characterized as an
extremist, minority one. However, given the rising anti-
American sentiment in the Japanese public, this author feels
that it is a viewpoint which may gain popularity in the
future. Other writers have stated similar viewpoints.
Takeaki Hori, an international affairs critic, describes the
U.S. logic in extracting funding from Japan for the Gulf war
as "scoundrel-like." [Ref. 124] He goes on to say
that the U.S and Japan must recognize that the end of the Cold
War has changed their respective international
positions. [Ref. 125] He further likens Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait to the U.S. invasions of Grenada and
Panama, and accuses the U.S. of hypocrisy by not taking any
action towards Israel, which has continuously occupied land
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illegally. Currently, the U.S. believes strongly in its
concept of Pax Americana, and then forces Japan to take
conforming actions. His conclusion is that the U.S. must treat
Japan on equal terms, and Japan should be willing to tell the
U.S. so. Takeshi Igarashi, a political science professor at
the University of Tokyo, questions the alliance in terms of
the validity of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan. Stating
that the Japanese public sees the stationing of troops in
Japan as an extension of the Occupation, thereby leading to
deep public resentment, he states that in this era of relaxing
international tension Japan must question why U.S. troops are
permitted to remain. Furthermore, in order to maintain
Japanese funding of U.S. troops stationed in Japan, the U.S.
must agree to two conditions. First, the purpose of the
troops and their operating guidelines must be made clear.
Second, Japan's financial participation would be conditional
on the observance of the first condition. The extension of
his argument is that the U.S. can no longer rely on
unqualified Japanese support for American military
action. [Ref. 126]
C. INTERNATIONALIST
The third school is the Internationalist school. Probably
the biggest distinction between the Internationalists and the
aforementioned Status quo or Neo nationalists is that these
two schools characterize Japan as unique or Eastern. The
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internationalists see a need for a break with the past, and
that the "Westernization" of Japan is necessary for Japan to
become a member of the modern world. [Ref. 127]
Although still a minority view, their viewpoint has become the
center of media and scholarly debate. The primary
characteristic of the Internationalist school is that they
advocate a much greater security role for Japan, but always
under the context of U.S. Japan relations. A review of
translated articles yields the following synthesis.
1. Internationalist debate during the Gulf War
The Japanese have begun to realize their single minded
pursuit of affluence and use of wealth to win friends and
influence people are not working. The Gulf crisis, as far as
Japan is concerned, was perceived as a diplomatic and public
relations failure. The first indication of her weakness was
the cancellation of Prime Minister Kaifu's trip to the Middle
East upon Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. "This postponement on
the eve of his departure reveals to the world with shameful
clarity that Kaifu, as Japan's Prime Minister, has no clear
vision of the post Cold-War world.", claimed a major Japanese
newspaper. [Ref. 128] This was followed by months
of debate in the Diet over issues such as constitutionality
and finances, with the perception that PM Kaifu was being
prodded along by the "Bush-phone." [Ref. 129]
According to Kenichi Ito, political science professor at the
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Aoyama Gakuin University, Japanese interest in the conflict
waned as soon as its own, direct concern, the Japanese
hostages, were released. After that, the Japanese joined the
ranks of onlookers, happy to look at the conflict from the
outside. [Ref. 130] Tokyo's policy makers knew
that despite Japan's desire to "look good" overseas, it was
deeply shamed by its response to the Gulf crisis. In the
words of scholar/former Diet member Motoo Shiina, by following
a course of being a deserter in the time of crisis, Japan was
once again turning towards isolation. [Ref. 131]
What about the post Cold-War world? Is it not a safer
place? According to the Internationalist scholars, it was
not. There are several points which must be kept in mind when
dealing with the new world. First, in spite of big visible
changes in Europe, as far as the Asia Pacific region is
concerned, there is no change in the severe military situation
in general. [Ref. 132] Second, regional conflicts
are more likely to appear, and their dangers have increased
for several reasons. It is much easier for adventurous
leaders to get modern weaponry and the increased
interdependence of nations causes the impact of such conflicts
to spread internationally. And finally, the major powers are
currently facing widespread opinions of "disarmament", thereby
perceived as having less resolve by other
countries. [Ref. 133]
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In addition to regional conflicts, the Soviet threat
(this debate took place during the Gulf crisis, prior to the
breakup of the Soviet Union) still exists for Ja] n. The
increased warmth between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. leaves
Japan out in the cold. The peace in Europe is more than
offset by the redeployment of weaponry from Eastern Europe to
east of the Ural mountains, and the Soviet Union is still
upgrading its strategic nuclear weapons and upgrading its air
force capabilities in the region around
Japan. [Ref . 134] Overall, anxieties have
increased not only for the above reasons, but new concerns
regarding North Korean development of nuclear weaponry,
instability on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. force reductions in
ROK, Japan, and the Philippines, and the political instability
/ethnic unrest in the Soviet Union.
To sum it up, the detente between the two superpowers
did not signal the advent of a new era of peace. Taichi
Sakaiya laments that the end of the cold war and restructuring
of world order are issues Japanese neither understand nor are
interested in. [Ref. 135] Motoo Shiina felt that
the Gulf Crisis had reminded Japan of the harsh fact that the
use of force and situations requiring its use will remain an
inescapable fact of international
relations. [Ref. 136] He goes on to say that the
only peace dividend is peace itself, there is no economic
gain. The world, Japan included, must create a framework
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which will allow everyone to continue receiving
peace . [Ref . 137
]
The North/South and East/West conflicts still exist
for Japan. According to Tokyo University professor Seizaburo
Sato, Japan, as dependent as it is upon global peace and free
trade, must take the initiative and assume its own burden in
helping to create a new world order in order to maintain its
prosperity and peace. [Ref. 138] In order to make
the post Cold-War world a peaceful one, the major powers must
cooperate closely and make it clear through their actions that
they will not allow aggression. [Ref. 139] And,
according to Kabun Muto, Japan _is a major power. In fact, if
balance of payments, debts and credits, and other factors are
all considered along with GNP, Japan is the #1 power in the
world. [Ref. 140] As such, it must bear




What should Japan have done? Iraq established a
dangerous precedent which, if left unchecked, could undermine
the international order. By responding to this, Japan could
have found a real voice for itself in this and other global
affairs. [Ref. 142] It also should have taken
action as this would have demonstrated to the world that Japan
supported the coalition. As a member of the UN, Japan has an
obligation to participate when necessary in collective
military action on order to stop
aggression. [Ref. 143] According to former Prime
Minister Nakasone, it should have showed willingness to share
the pains of maintaining order and worked towards a
resolution, without running away from its
responsibilities. [Ref. 144] Specific steps to be
taken included economic assistance to those countries
adversely affected by the embargo; and a contribution to the
multinational forces. [Ref. 145] Shiina backs this
up by stating that the most effective step Japan could have
taken would have been to send personnel. This would have
shown that the Japanese people are willing to stand with its
allies, sharing risk and hardship. [Ref. 146] One
scholar, Masamichi Inoki, mentions that JMSDF ships should
have been sent. As long as they transited international
waters there would be no repercussions, and showing the
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Japanese flag would have avoided embarrassment about the lack
of Japanese response. [Ref. 147] Inoki's debate
partner in the article, Shinichi Kitaoka, felt that although
sending JMSDF ships may have been too drastic a step, there
were several areas in which personnel and equipment could have
been sent where their contribution would have been helpful,
justified, and permitted by public and international opinion.
These are: peace keeping operations (PKO), freedom of
navigation, logistics transportation, medical, and
construction. [Ref. 148] Kenichi Ito states that
the very least Japan could have done was to provide some of
this rear guard support. [Ref. 149] Former
/Ambassador to the US Nobuo Matsunaga asked who could
realistically criticize the use of SDF ships and planes to
transport refugees out of the area? [Ref. 150]
Kitaoka states that transportation was the area where Japan
could have helped out the most, but instead, Japan took a
negative step by outlining unrealistic restrictions.
To Kenichi Ito, the Gulf Crisis was a good opportunity
to show the SDF to the world, that is, a SDF that will not
aggress against other countries, but will defend peace. At
the very least, it would have demonstrated to the world that
Japan contributed. Otherwise, states Seizaburo Sato, the
impression would arise that Japan foists off all of its dirty
work to someone else.
54
The next question to arise is whether or not it would
have been possible to deploy the SDF The first item is that
of legality. Japan has two laws which strictly govern the use
of the SDF. These are Article 9 of its Constitution, and the
SDF Law. Article 9 states that Japan renounces the use of
force as a means of settling international disputes. Although
some, such as Jun Eto [Ref. 151] and MP
Nakasone, [Ref. 152] state that the Constitution
must be revised immediately, Inoki and Kitaoka feel that it is
probably best to delay any revisions until the pre WV
"militarists" die off and the currently charged political
atmosphere settles down. [Ref. 153]
In the meantime, the Constitution can be
reinterpreted. In the views of Seizaburo Sato and Hisahiko
Okazaki, Japan's Constitution and laws can be interpreted
minimally or maximally. [Ref. 154] The minimalist
concept says Japan cannot do anything that is not explicitly
condoned by law. The maximalist concept is that Japan can do
anything not specifically prohibited. Japanese politicians
and bureaucrats tend to be maximalists when it comes to
administrative guidance of business, but minimalists in their
treatment of security affairs. Japan's current security policy
is the result of political maneuvering within the Diet, with
the government regularly yielding to opposition party demands.
It is not a well thought out, defined, rational
policy. [Ref. 155]
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Sato goes on to state that the intent of the drafters
of the Constitution was to prevent Japan from having military
power only if its purpose was to invade another
country. [Ref. 156] No Constitution could be valid
if it denies a sovereign state the inherent minimum right of
self defense. [Ref. 157] Also, Article 9 does not
negate Japan's need to resist outside force. That rationale,
to resist outside force, is the basis for Japan's security
treaty with the United States and United Nations membership.
Japan must have its own emergency capability to repulse
attack, at least temporarily. He concludes by saying war
potential does not mean the same thing as defense
capability. [Ref. 158]
Former Prime Minister Nakasone states that there are
two conditions which must be met for this reinterpretat ion to
be enacted. First, Japan's independence and peace must be
directly threatened, or the international community must be
united in denouncing a country which has acted aggressively.
Second, the reinterpretation should not extend to allowing the
dispatch of the SDF to engage directly in
fighting. [Ref. 159] Although the first condition
is universal, some scholars would engage the SDF in fighting.
The Yomiuri and Sankei newspapers both, through their
editorials, advocated constitutional reinterpretation and the
deployment of the SDF, and criticized Prime Minister Kaifu for
waffling in front of the Diet on these two
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points. [Ref. 160] PM Kaifu made a mistake when he
told the Diet that he had no intention of reinterpreting or
revising the Constitution. What he should have said,
according to Kenichi Ito, was that in view of Japan's role in
the Gulf crisis, we had no choice but to change the customary
interpretation of the Constitution. [Ref. 161]
Even if this gesture did not result in the deployment of SDF,
Ito felt that at the very least it would have opened a debate
which would have aroused the Japanese to a sense of their
international mission and an awareness of national
security. [Ref. 162] The Japanese must expand
their defense horizon to encompass the global security
dimension. For this, the Constitution must be reinterpreted.
The collective right of self defense (CRSD) is the
tool for this reinterpretation . This is the approach taken by
the newspapers and scholars advocating reinterpretation. In
September, 1990, the Yomiuri newspaper advocated
constitutional debate in order to form an appropriate response
to the question of Japan's international
responsibility. [Ref. 163] By October, it was
stating that the interpretation of the CRSD as
unconstitutional was not laid out in the Constitution itself,
but rather the interpretation of successive cabinets,
that "either we recognize the exercise of the collective right
of self defense limited solely to support of multinational
forces, or work out new judgements that these are actions that
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occur in a different dimension from the collective right of
self defense" [Ref. 164]. These sentiments are
also expressed by the Sankei newspaper in editorials in
September/October 1990. [Ref. 165]
Seizaburo Sato, who previously served as national
security advisor to PM Nakasone, has the following concept.
In order for Japan to play an active role in maintaining
global order, the Japanese must make a major shift in thinking
on the right of collective self defense and the meaning of
Japan's exclusively defensive stance. The collective right of
self defense should be exercised in response to direct threats
to Japan or an act of aggression widely condemned by the
international community. Article 98 of the Constitution
states that all treaties shall be faithfully observed,
including the United Nations Charter. Japan's renunciation of
the collective right of self defense is in fact an abdication
of its responsibilities as a UN member. [Ref. 166]
A further restriction governing the SDF is the Self
Defense Force Law. At present, the interpretation of this law
has been whittled away by the opposition parties to a
minimalist interpretation. It is being used as an excuse to
avoid doing something undesirable. A broader interpretation
of the law will make it possible for Japan to contribute
militarily in the Middle East, and be a good temporary
solution. The law must be revised in the long run. This was
pointed out by the Sankei newspaper on September 27,
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1990. [Ref. 167] The law must be amended to allow
the SDF to provide logistic support overseas, participate ..
UN peacekeeping operations, and repatriate Japanese citizens.
A few additions to the law could accomplish all this and,
because the SDF Law is less vulnerable to parliamentary
scrutiny, allow Japan to react to major crises with major
actions
.
A final tool which could be utilized to facilitate the
deployment of SDF is the UN Charter. The UN Charter could
pave the way for Japan to participate in peace keeping
operations. The charter is consistent with the Japanese
Constitution, both being derived from the same post ,.".;:;
ideals. The charter can be utilized two ways. First, peace
keeping operations within the mandate of the charter do not
have to be considered self defense. It would be part of
Japan's inherent diplomatic authority. Second, Article 2 of
the charter renounces force, but Article 51 acknowledges
member states' "inherent right of individual or collective
self defense". This logic can be applied to the Japanese
Constitution, too.
3. Internationalist Reactions to SDF Deployment
Opposition
The next section of this thesis deals with the
opposition to the deployment of SDF personnel. The Gulf '..
would have been an ideal opportunity for Japan to take on such
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a role, especially as most of the world would have supported
such efforts. For the Internationalists, to lose this
opportunity would be a major setback. Additionally. Japan's
subsequent failure to do so sparked severe criticism from
other nations, most significantly the US. Such a result was
predicted by the Internationalists. Therefore, a look at the
criticism leveled by the Internationalists against those
opposing deployment of the SDF serves to illustrate the
strength of their belief that Japan should assume a greater-
international role.
First, the debate in the Diet will be reviewed. The
opposition came mostly from the Japan Socialist Party ( now
renamed the Social Democratic Party of Japan or SDPJ, but JSP
will be used in this paper)
,
with the Komeito visibly
softening its opposition to the SDF. The former leader, Takako
Doi , led the opposition debate in the Diet over the United
Nations Peace Keeping Bill. According to Kenichi Ito, the
debate focused solely on the constitutionality of the
bill. [Ref. 168] It did not pose the questions of:
a) the significance of the Gulf crisis to the world in
general, and Japan in particular; b) what response Japan
should make; c) whether Japan could respond sufficiently under
the existing legal system and available resources; and d) what
to do if Japan could not respond sufficiently. In other
words, states Ito, it avoided the primary
issue. [Ref. 169]
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He goes on to say that throughout the JSP stance, all
focus was on opposing the deployment of the SDF . No attention
at all was given to Saddam Hussein or Iraq. To him, this
indicates that the JSP pretends that such crises and problems
do not exist. Ms. Doi thinks that the "no war structure" of
the new world order will be ready made, and Japan does not
have to make a contribution. Ito concludes by saying that at
a critical stage where the participation of all countries is
vital to whether or not the demise of the Cold War leads to an
era of peace, Ms. Doi brings out the Japanese "no war
constitution" which rejects precisely the required positive
steps and acts like the Constitution was entirely responsible
for causing the current world situation. [Ref. 170]
Seizaburo Sato also laments this situation, saying that as
long as the country's largest opposition party has this
Utopian dream, prospects for Japan are
bleak. [Ref. 171]
Two major newspapers, the Asahi and the Mair.ichi , cook
up the position of advocating strict interpretation of the
Constitution and opposing the deployment of the SDF. Kenichi
Ito sharply criticizes them, saying that by using pretty words
like Japan must make its "unique" contributions, the
newspapers avoided recommending what specific steps Japan
should take. [Ref. 172] At that point, the
rhetoric of these papers clouded over. Both complained, but
did not offer any constructive solutions. One example Ito
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brings out is Asahi ' s proposal for a separate "Peace
Cooperation Corps" (PCC) to be established separate from the
SDF . However, in an earlier editorial, it had criticized the
government for suggesting that unarmed members of the SDF be
sent to assist in rear guard support operations. It queried
"The government seems to be of the opinion that we are limited
to rear guard support without the use of military force, but
does this make any sense? Having been perceived as
'soldiers', can members of the Self Defense Force suddenly
slip away from the battle line when hostilities begin without
inviting the derision and distrust of other nations?" This
criticism would most probably apply to Asahi ' s PCC, but the
Asahi does not seem to notice this hypocrisy. [Ref. 173]
This brings up another point of debate: armed or
unarmed personnel. Several suggestions arose for sending
either unarmed soldiers or civilians to the Gulf to assist in
rear guard actions. Eto queries what is the purpose of the
SDF if not to protect Japanese civilians
abroad. [Ref. 174] He is not the only one. In the
first place, questions Okazaki, what happens when those
civilians are exposed to danger? Will they be permitted to
drop their duties and flee? If this happens, Japan will
become the object of international scorn and
contempt. [Ref. 175] In the joint journal article
with Okazaki, Seizaburo Sato asks how the government can
suggest sending civilians instead of the SDF? [Ref. 176] To
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send civilians instead of the SDF is an affront to the members
of the SDF. To him, sending civilians and diplomats to front
lines, but insisting the SDF stay at home when t.
professional, well trained corps is available is just like
saying the professional corps is useless. He brings up
Okazaki's earlier point by adding that the government will
feel obligated to remove those civilians as soon as danger
threatens. [Ref. 177] To Motoo Shiina and Kenichi
Ito, sending unarmed soldiers would have the same
effect. [Ref. 178] In the first place, nc one
would go. Secondly, such civilian or unarmed troops would be
a handicap to any commander. Civilians could not be relied
upon to go into dangerous areas. Any force unable to defend
itself would be another burden to be protected. As Ito
sarcastically asks, perhaps JSP Secretary General Yamaguchi
needs to think about such things before he makes suggestions
to send unarmed soldiers or civilians. [Ref. 179]
He goes on to state that self defense is a right, regardless
of whether that person is civilian or military, and no one
should be sent into a battle zone unarmed. Neither JSP nor
Asahi denied that personnel must be sent. Rather, their bone
of contention was whether or not this contribution could be
military. [Ref. 180] However, Ito concludes, those
personnel should have the right of self defense.
What about pacifism? The reasoning is: as the
conscientious objector nation of the world, Japan can afford
to not participate. However, according to Seizaburo Sato,
pacifism has its inherent dangers. The problem with Japan's
pacifism is that it is "one country"
pacifism. [Ref. 181] This pacifism, as pandered to
by the opposing party and newspapers, is one in which the
Japanese want to be the only ones who avoid all risks and keep
a distance between themselves and danger. The "conscientious
objector" commentators are just pretending to be so. They
lack the positive will to pay the price, and fail to grasp the
very concept of paying the price that must be paid for the
privilege of objecting to military service. Uncompromising
pacifism is for religious paragons. For ordinary individuals,
Sato concludes, it is just another name for cowardice and
defeatism. Kenichi Ito is more pragmatic. To him,




To Kitaoka, the reason for Japanese pacifism is
obvious. Having built up a level of affluence, the Japanese
do not want to give up what they have. A concern is that by
holding on tightly now, Japan may lose much more in the long
run. [Ref. 183] To Shiina, if Japan is seen as a
conscientious objector on a global level, its very survival
could be endangered. [Ref. 184] For Ito, Japan has
become too important a nation to act that way, and the
international system cannot function if Japan persists in its
pacifism. [Ref. 185] To Sato, pacifism ignores the
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fact Japan's own interests are threatened by the aqi
invasion, and also ignores compliance with UN Security Council
resolutions. Kitaoka summarizes the problem neatly. To him,
pacifism is predicated on the willingness of somebody else to
use force to defend Japan's freedom. The problem is that if
Japan does not help others, no one will help
her. [Ref. 186]
The final arguments for opposing positive action, as
pointed out by Motoo Shiina, are that none is needed because
Japan is too important. The first argumenc theorizes that if
Japan will just toe the line and keep its role as a
"mercantile" nation, things will work out. To Shiina, this
argument ignores the fact Japan is enmeshed in the
international community. It was previously allowed to exist
as an economic giant because it took up a position as a
Western bloc member, and played a minimal security role under
the US/Japan security treaty. A country of merchants cannot
earn respect as a nation. When a nation shows itself unable
to join allies in time of crisis, it must resign itself to an
outsider's role. [Ref. 187]
The second argument suggests that Japan will always
find an ally in the U.S. as the two countries are so
interdependent that Washington cannot afford to sever
relations. Shiina counters by saying that unfortunately
people, and governments, do not always behave in a purely
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rational manner. This has been proven throughout
history. [Ref. 188]
Action has to be taken. Inoki feels that failing to
act in effect means condoning aggressive behavior. If Japan
was the only country to take an anti-war stance, it might not
be such a problem, but what if every nation acted that way?
There will be no more international
order. [Ref. 189] MP Nakasone states that by
clinging stubbornly to its egoism of the past and thinking
only of self interest, Japan will not win the acceptance of
the rest of the world, nor perpetuate its prosperity. Anti
Japanese sentiments will only grow stronger as long as Japan
behaves like a passive bystander. [Ref. 190]
4. Internationalist world view
The internationalists see the post Cold War world in
the following manner. As stated earlier, regional conflicts
are not likely to disappear, and will also become more deadly
due to weapons proliferation. Changes in the global situation
and Japan's emergence as a major power have increased the
importance of the U.S. /Japan alliance, and have brought Japan
to a turning point in its foreign
policy. [Ref. 191] Also stated earlier was that
the end of the Cold War and subsequent restructuring of the
world order are issues that Japanese currently neither
understand nor are interested in. These notions, according to
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Taichi Sakaiya, must change. [Ref. 192] To Sato,
Japan has become too big to avoid playing a political and
military role in international affairs. [Ref. 193]
Additionally, the Gulf coalition, which would not have been
possible during the Cold War, offers new possibilities for
maintaining order in the future. The end of the Cold War
makes it easier to prevent and localize regional
conflicts. [Ref. 194] Sakaiya goes on to state
that Japan has a responsibility to deter and resolve regional
conflicts. [Ref. 195] Up to now, Japan could say
it had its hands full with countering the Soviet threat, but
this excuse is no longer valid. [Ref. 196]
To the Internationalists, the fundamental change in
the global situation is that the Soviet threat, as perceived
by other countries, has diminished. From now on, a cour.'
will no longer be counted upon simply by virtue of its
position vis a vis the Soviet Union. All over the world,
countries are starting to wonder who their real allies
are. [Ref. 197] A new trend is developing where
countries cooperate internationally to ensure that justice
prevails in the world order. [Ref. 198] This order
is essential to Japan, as dependent as it is on global peace
and free trade for its own prosperity. [Ref. 199]
The task facing Japan is to join the other nations in
establishing the rules for the framework of receiving peace,
and to establish her position within it. [Ref. 2(
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Therefore, Japan must shake loose its passive complacency, and
step forward with an independent foreign policy.
What has been called an "independent" diplomacy in the
recent past is merely "anti-American" foreign policy,
according to Taichi Sakaiya. A truly independent foreign
policy must be devised and implemented, one based on a long
range strategy and designed to serve the interests of the
country as a whole. [Ref. 201]
He goes on to state that a true foreign policy must
encompass diplomacy, security, and economics. Japan must
change its self -centered economic policies. Most Japanese are
under the impression that they have a free market economy, but
this is not the case. In fact, they have a bureaucratically
guided economy, one where industry cooperates closely with
government, but few Japanese realize
this. [Ref. 202] As one of the greatest
beneficiaries of the multilateral free trade system, Japan
will also be one of the most seriously damaged countries
should protectionism raise its head on a global
basis. [Ref. 203] Ito also feels the same way. To him, Japan
must effect complete liberalization of its markets. It can no
longer bask in the indulgence of other
countries. [Ref. 204]
While the preceding paragraph could be greatly
expanded upon, the focus of this paper will remain on
security. Up to now, Japan has taken advantage of "burden
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sharing", which enabled it to take up less than its fair share
of the security problem as long as it paid its dues. Sakaiya
likens this to "expense account" thinking, entertaining the
other party and hoping he forgets the primary issue. But from
now on, Japan must join in "decision
sharing". [Ref. 205] Other Internationalists
state that Japan can no longer avoid military issues. There is
no way the international order can be maintained without
military power. [Ref. 206] It can n< longer duck
the collective defense issue. As a major power, Japan has
both the right and duty of collective self
defense. [Ref. 207] Granted, Japan cannot become
a superpower. However, regional conflicts are of global
concern. Japan could help in deployment of conventional
forces and logistic support. As she can do this relatively
easily, Japan should expect to receive requests for such in
the future. [Ref. 208] The need henceforth is for
the government to amend its stance in the direction of
permitting the deployment of the SDF on a wider scope.
Why the SDF? As stated earlier, a nation that wants
to be part of the international community must contribute to
world order and peace. Sending the SDF, even in indirect
military roles, will show Japan ' s determination to fulfill its
obligations. If not, other countries will begin to question
Japan's substance as a nation. [Ref. 209]
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To the Internationalists, now is a good time to
establish a greater role for Japan. Utilizing the demands for
Japan's greater security role will make a breakthrough in
resolving the dilemma of Japan's security
shyness. [Ref. 210] The Japanese people are
beginning to support a larger role, as evidenced by the fact
3 out of 4 Japanese supported the decision to deploy
minesweepers to the Gulf. [Ref. 211] The Japan
Defense Agency should start its own overseas diplomacy in
order to obtain other countries' trust through dialogue and
consultation not only about Japan's image, but also addressing
the deployment of the SDF. [Ref. 212] Given that
Japan must establish a wider role for herself in global
security, what are the steps to be taken? Japan's security
policy has been linked to the United States. The question to
be answered is whether or not this relationship should be
abolished or modified.
As stated earlier, Japan has basked in the benevolence
of the US nuclear and security umbrella. Although Japan must
take on a greater role, the Internationalists strongly feel
that it is critical that the close alliance with the United
States be maintained. The US/Japan Mutual Security Treaty
guarantees that the US will act on Japan's behalf. This
guarantee is not present in the UN charter. Therefore,
Japan's security must depend upon her alliance with the US,
not the UN. [Ref. 213] If nothing else, the Gulf
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crisis has created a renewed awareness of the United States'
leadership role in the post VJar
world. [Ref. 214] The US effort to establish a
multilateral framework marked a revolutionary development in
the approach to controlling international
conflicts. [Ref. 215] American "idealist" foreign
policy is great, but may very soon wane. [Ref. 216]
Combined with the perceived downfall of Communism, the US
criteria in selecting its allies may well change. [Ref. 217]
The light in which the US, and other countries, view Japan can
very well determine Japan's future. If the image is bad
enough, Washington may move towards policies which are not
even in its own best interest, given the interdependence
between US and Japan. Once this shift takes place, there is
no stopping it. [Ref. 218] Japan is dangerously
close to that situation now. During the Gulf crisis, the US
was looking for a heart in allied nations, a heart that
understood the great significance in the shedding of American
blood for the sake of world peace. Japan did not show that
heart. [Ref. 219] By contrast, the United Kingdom
did. Immediately prior to leaving office, former Prime
Minister Thatcher "castigated the other Western allies for
their laggard response to the Gulf crisis and warned that
unless they cooperated actively they would force the United
States into an isolated leadership
position." [Ref. 220] Japan paled in comparison.
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Indeed, Japan's lack of response and reluctant action could
very well be taken as signs that Japan is considering ending
its alliance with the United States. The results could be
disastrous
.
The Internationalists feel that Japan has become too
big to avoid playing a military role in international affairs.
As the United States cannot go it alone without the support of
its allies, its expectations of Japan will only become
stronger. [Ref. 221] Japan must help in forming
new policies in preserving world peace. Not only is the
danger of regional conflicts high, but the Soviet threat still
exists. Japan can help the US counter that threat by bearing
a major portion of the burden of maintaining the military
balance in her region. [Ref. 222]
In the eyes of the Internationalists, the alliance
with the U.S. is significant for other reasons as well.
First, Japan lacks the ability to defend herself on her own.
Therefore its security depends on US resolve. If the US
begins to doubt that Japan is a true ally, Japan cannot count
on its help. [Ref. 223] Second, the treaty
provides the best assurance that neither Japan nor any other
Asian power steps out of line. This is because as long as the
alliance is in effect, Japan cannot tilt in a hawkish
direction. Finally, Japan must recognize its own history vis-
a-vis its Asian neighbors. [Ref. 224] As long as
Japan ties its security setup to the alliance, Asian neighbors
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will not worry as much. [Ref. 225] This was
emphasized by Singapore Prime Minister Goh to Prime Minister
Kaifu during the latter 's visit to Singapore, and PM Kaifu
acknowledged the necessity [Ref. 226].
One possible counterargument might be that Japan
should emphasize the UN Charter as the cornerstone of its
security policy. Motoo Shiina warns that the problem with the
Charter is that it does not guarantee that the Security
Council will act on Japan's behalf should she be threatened in
the future. Most people do not remember that the Security
Council opposed Japan's entry into the U.N. for five
years. [Ref. 227]
5. Internationalists and the Mutual Security Treaty
For the above reasons, the U.S. Japan alliance must be
maintained. This does not mean, however, that revisions to
the Treaty are out of the question. The problem is timing.
Now is not a suitable time to be making changes to the treaty.
Anti-Americanism is rampant among the Japanese public. The
political atmosphere is highly charged, and a practical debate
might not take place. Another caution, although specifically
voiced in regard to changing Japan's Constitution, may very
well also apply towards the treaty. Inoki Masamichi, chairman
of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, cautions
that a lot of voices calling for reform (to the Constitution)
are pre WWII militarists, and that at some point in the
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future, a more aggressive, younger generation will address
this matter calmly and sensibly. [Ref. 228] This
caution might also be applied towards any revisions to the
security treaty.
In the meantime, although a revision to the treaty
might be desired, it is not absolutely necessary for change to
occur. In a response to the question of treaty revisions, Dr.
Seizaburo Sato had the following to say to this
author: [Ref. 229]
Question (LT Young) : How should the Mutual Security Treaty be
handled in the future? . Should it be maintained as
is, or changed to a more "mutual" treaty?
Answer (Dr. Sato) : I think it is desirable to change it
(the US Japan Mutual Security Treaty) to a more
"mutual" one. But even so, no change is absolutely
required. It is possible to interpret the treaty in
a flexible manner, and thus utilize the treaty.
Although Americans tend to favor a legalistic approach
and always want to change laws, Japanese are more
practical. The law does not have to be changed.
Question: Should the treaty be changed eventually?
Answer: Yes. Of course. Towards a more equal treaty, not
one-sided as it currently is. That has got to be
better. But that doesn't mean that nothing can be
accomplished until the change takes place.
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6. Internationalists' Agenda
This brings up the next question. ...it sort of
changes should take place? One factor is actual military
strength. Regarding the actual makeup of Japan's military,
several options are presented by the internationalists. At
one extreme is Tetsuya Kataoka, a Japanese national and senior
research fellow at the Hoover Institution. He recommends
Japan "purchase" the U.S. Seventh Fleet and provide protection
for 3000 miles of sea routes. The U.S. would then just
maintain its Third Fleet for Pacific security, and rake in the
profits from the major fleet sale to help offset the trade
deficit. Joint U.S. /Japan fleets would then deploy to the
Indian Ocean as required. [Ref. 230] A look at the
map shows that resultant peacetime Japanese coverage would
have JMSDF destroyers off Hawaii and JMSDF P-3's at Diego
Garcia. Although he mentions that the new relationship would
not threaten other countries in the region, the U.S. might add
itself to the list of threatened
countries. [Ref. 231]
Professor Sato advocates a six point agenda which
contains the following items: [Ref. 232]
1. Enhanced Wide Area Surveillance Capability: involving
closer integration of existing air, ground, and sea
surveillance systems, acquisition of airborne warning and
control systems (AWACS) , over-the-horizon Radar (OTHR)
,
and surveillance towed array sensor system; all closely
integrated with U.S. systems.
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2. Enhanced Extended Air Defense Capability: achieved by
acquisition of new, improved three dimensional radar,
more F-15's, Patriots , AWACS , airborne tankers, V/STOL
carriers, AEGIS ships, and an anti-tactical missile
system. This would enhance the ability of the U.S. and
Japan to act as one to defend the islands, deter threats,
and secure reinforcement routes from the U.S.
3. Enhanced ASW capability: achieved by acquisition of P-3
update III, SH-60, and SURTASS; and improvements in
antisubmarine torpedo, surface vessel, and submarine
capabilities. This will be combined with an ASW center
for quick analysis and development of tactics. This
reflects the Soviet deficiency of reliance on land-based
air. The main threat outside that sphere of coverage
would be attack submarines. Significant improvements
here would effective deterrence.
4. Enhanced Defense Capability of the Japanese Islands:
through strengthening bases, increasing stockpiles, and
promoting further integration between the three services.
5. Wartime Host Nation Support: to support the tactical
actions of U.S. forces during wartime on the Japanese
islands and in the surrounding regions. Although
significant support exists now, during peacetime, wartime
augmentation must be planned and ready to be implemented.
6. Joint Weapons Research, Development, and Production: in
order to maximize efficient use of technology advantages
on both sides, and to promote increased interoperability
between U.S. and Japanese forces.
As can be seen, the main theme of his plan is to
complement the U.S. to the greatest extent possible. This
concept, complementing the U.S., is also promoted by most
other internationalists. They strongly feel that rejecting
the U.S. alliance would inevitably lead to Japan's full scale
rearmament, which would not be tolerated by other countries.
Especially vocal is Mineo Kyudai, an international military
affairs commentator. In a rebuttal to MP Ishihara's book, he
takes issue with MP Ishihara's comment that Japan could
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maintain an adequate defense capability with current defense
spending levels. Kyudai states:
Actually the exact opposite is true. Japan would have to
embark on the construction of a full-scale military
establishment, shouldering all the uneconomical costs such
an undertaking would entail, and it would have to supply
by itself all the reinforcements it can now expect from
the United States. As nearby nations turned their back on
Japan, meanwhile, we would find ourselves in an
increasingly vulnerable position of global isolation,
necessitating the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Military spending would inevitably mount to astronomical
heights. [Ref. 233]
Regarding the Neo-Nationalists ' world view, he says
the following:
Especially since World War II, defense has come to
be a collective endeavor under a single superpower. Those
who find this intolerable, who would make Japan the leader
and the United States the follower, would only guide us
toward a second Pearl Harbor. People like Ishihara fail
to see this broader picture. Perceiving Japan-U.S.
relations from solely a nationalist viewpoint, they treat
American calls for increased Japanese spending in one area
or another as unfair and unreasonable requests. Thinking
that they are being insulted, they lash back with charges
of American racial prejudice. Their fundamental error is
a failure to understand the necessity of alliances in
current military strategy. Coupled with their emotional
nationalism, this leads them to see the mutual security
setup as an irrational structure. But as I have
demonstrated, their concept of an independent defense
setup does not stand up. For contemporary Japan, it is a
mere illusion. [Ref. 234]
7. Revising the Security Treaty
This brings the study to its final section, proposed
revisions to the security treaty. One realization which
gradually became apparent as this author undertook the
research for this thesis was the fact not one of the
Internationalists mentioned in writing that the U.S. -Japan
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Mutual Security had to be revised. Many Internationalists
talk of revising the Self Defense Forces Law, and even re-
interpreting the Constitution, but not one touched upon
security treaty revisions. The only hard evidence that could
be found was an answer by Dr Seizaburo Sato given to a direct
question by this author during the course of an interview.
The only people to state in writing that the treaty needed
revision were Neo Nationalists and they want to scrap the
treaty
.
This enigma gives rise to several questions. First,
is the question of treaty revision a taboo subject for
Internationalists? Possibly. After all, treaty revision is
the current distinguishing feature of Neo-Nat ionalist s and the
last thing an Internationalist would want would be to be
labeled as a "Neo Nationalist."
Second, is the treaty suitable for modern Japan? The
answer is no. Internationalists claim that the U.S. -Japan
Security Treaty freezes the state of international relations
circa 1960. [Ref . 235] Kazuo Ijiri, editorial
writer for the Nihon Keizai Shimbun , likens the treaty to one
befitting what he calls a "small" country. His point is that
when the treaty, which commits the U.S. to defend Japan but
not vice versa, was signed, Japan was a minor country in terms
of economic strength. The treaty was therefore proper at the
time. Since then, Japan has developed into an economic
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superpower, and the treaty is no longer suitable. In his own
words
:
As long as Japan was inconspicuous both militarily
and economically, it was of course quite proper for us to
act accordingly. But it is grotesque for a country that
has grown into an economic superpower to continue to play
the part of a helpless weakling. In order to avoid coming
to terms with this incongruity, we have clung all the
harder to pacifism. Pretending to be weak and proclaiming
our pacifist ideals has been the easiest course for us.
But we can hardly expect other countries to enjoy this
bizarre performance, especially since our shrinking away
from military conflicts is accompanied by such
aggressiveness in our economic expansion. What has our
pacifism accomplished? .. .Along with the idea of "little
Japan, " pacifism should have been abandoned at some point
during the course of our growth into a major economic
power. [Ref. 236]
Assuming that the Internationalists feel the treaty,
in its current format, is unsuitable for modern Japan, why are
they not proposing specific revisions to the treaty? Perhaps
the answer lies in necessity. Although treaty revisions are
desired in the long term, they are not needed immediately, and
should be deferred until after Japan has grasped a larger
international role and has a clearer vision of a long term
strategy. To revise the treaty in the current atmosphere of
charged public and political attitudes while Japan's future
role is still poorly defined might actually be
counterproductive. In the meantime, flexible interpretations
of existing law will suffice in order for Japan to expand her
international role. This was alluded to by Dr. Seizaburo
Sato, as quoted earlier in this study.
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Therefore, the final point to discuss is how Japan
will go about expanding her role. While political and
economic rol2 expansion can be discussed at length, this study
will, in interest of brevity, concentrate on military role,
specifically the use of Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF).
Japan has two laws which strictly govern the use of
the SDF. These are Article 9 of its Constitution, and the SDF
Law. Article 9 states that Japan renounces the use of force
as a means of settling international
disputes. [Ref. 237] However, the Constitution can
be reinterpreted. As indicated earlier, Japan's Constitution
and laws can be interpreted minimally or maximally. The
minimalist derivation of Japan's security policy is not what
was originally intended.
The intent of the drafters of the Constitution was to
prevent Japan from having military power only if its purpose
was to invade another country. [Ref. 238] No
Constitution could be valid if it denies a sovereign state the
inherent minimum right of self defense. [Ref. 239]
Also, Article 9 also does not negate Japan's need to resist
outside force. That rationale, to resist outside force, is
the basis for Japan's security treaty with the United States
and United Nations membership. Japan must have its own
emergency capability to repulse attack, at least temporarily.
War potential does not mean the same thing as defense
capability. [Ref. 240]
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As stated in an earlier section of this thesis,
Internationalists feel that Japan can currently expand her
international security role utilizing flexible interpretations
of existing law. Revisions to law do not need to take place
immediately. They can be deferred.
The same logic, flexible interpretation, can also be
applied to the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty. For example,
suppose Japan was under attack by a hostile power. At the
same time, U.S. naval vessels enroute Japan were also
attacked. Because those vessels were directly related to
Japan's defense, ASDF aircraft and MSDF ships could engage
those enemy aircraft. This was an actual test case put before
the government in 1983. [Ref. 241] Although the
judgement was ultimately decided to be an exercise of
individual self defense, the test case reflects a desire to
legitimize collective self defense. [Ref. 242]
D. CONCLUSION
As outlined above, there exists within the Japanese right
a fertile debate regarding Japan's security policy and
relations with the United States. Within this debate, the
Internationalist school has been credited with occupying the
center stage in policy discussions, and increasing their
influence over the last two decades. [Ref. 243]
The collapse of the Soviet Union and Gulf War have served to
intensify this policy debate. Although a recent Army study by
Eugene Brown concludes that public indifference and porkbarrel
politics will thwart the opinion leaders for quite some
time, [Ref. 244] the author differs with Brown's
conclusion. The Japanese public has a greater awareness of
what is happening in the world around them. Perhaps the rise
in "anti-Americanism" is a symbol of this new awareness.
Increasingly, the Japanese are becoming aware of problems
within their own country. The author's research in Japan in
December, 1991 has clearly revealed this new awareness.




IV POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF JAPAN'S ROLE
Assuming that Japan may soon seek to expand her role in
the world, the question to be raised is: Where? Professor
Nakanishi Terumasa states the following:
As the turn of the century nears, many Japanese will find
it increasingly difficult to resist the lure of the "Asian
option." For at least three reasons, they will be tempted
to join forces with their East Asian neighbors. One is
that the region is fast becoming an interdependent
economic zone, and the horizontal division of labor among
the counterpart industries in each country is expected to
develop. Another is that a multipolar political order is
taking shape in the region, and in such order Japan can
expand its role. The third is that the generation of
anti-Japanese Asians --or perhaps I should say Asians
suspicious of Japan-- will gradually pass from the scene.
Along with the changes in industrial structure, this
should create more opportunities for partnerships with
people in other East Asian countries
.
Given this context, the new order should give Japan the
chance to renew its identification with the rest of Asia
at the same time as it shoulders more responsibilities in
the global community. Provided that we set a sufficiently
long time frame for the endeavor, Japan can draw closer to
other Asian countries without hindering the formation of
a more mature global perspective. [Ref. 245]
To be sure, nowhere in his article does Professor
Nakanishi mention a military role for Japan. However, his
statement does provide an avenue to explore. Lie many
studies have been written about Japan's economic role in East
Asia, this thesis is focused upon Japan's security role.
Previous sections have argued that Japan might well expand her
security role, past her immediate territories and surrounding
waters, to a more international role. For some, the logical
scene for this expansion may seem to be East Asia. For that
reason, this section of the study will examine prospects for
an expansion of Japan's regional security role into East Asia.
Once again, Asian opinion leaders will be studied. The




In order for Japan to carry out such actions as proposed
above, the key element concerned is the opposition of other
countries. As far as Northeast Asia is concerned, Japan's
options are closed. Japan's immediate neighbors suffered
greatly at Japan's hands and are not likely to forget. Korea
has especially bitter feelings towards Japan, and the dislike
is mutual. Taiwan's memories are that of Nationalist China.
Additionally, these two countries are further irritated by
increasing trade deficits with Japan, enough so that the two
countries are attempting to combine their resources in order
to counter Japan. Their dissatisfaction with Japan is so
great the two countries are overlooking the fact they are
likely to become political and economic rivals in the very
near future. [Ref. 246]
Finally, there is China. China's fear of Japan is
illustrated by strategist Chen Xiaogong's comment in the
Liberation Army Daily in September, 1990: " One cannot rule
out the probability that Japan and a unified Germany will
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develop into global military powers. Japan now has 300,000
troops, of whom 70% are officers and non-coms. .
.
(and) already
possess the economic, scientific and technical potential ... to
leap over the nuclear period and develop intelligent non-
nuclear space weapons." [Ref. 247] Even more
indicative was China's reaction to the deployment of JMSDF
minesweepers. Although Japan's efforts received favorable
reactions from most nations in the area, China was an
exception. China regarded this as a dangerous first step
towards an increase in Japanese military activity
overseas. [Ref. 248]
It appears Japan's options here are fairly limited.
Historical differences and trade disputes make an expansion of
Japan's security role extremely difficult, perhaps impossible,
in Northeast Asia. The study will now move to the next
possible arena.
B. SOUTHEAST ASIA
The key to Japan's efforts to expand her security role
lies in the ASEAN nations. Not only is the Southeast Asian
experience with Japanese aggression shorter and relatively
less odious than Northeast Asian nations, but these same
countries see Japan as a vital component in their own
development. An excellent example is Malaysia's "Look East"
program. Finally, these countries exhibited friendly
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attitudes towards Japan during the hard times following the
Gulf War, when friends were scarce.
Throughout the ASEAN capitals there was a general approval
of the JMSDF's first operational mission beyond territorial
waters since WWII. Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir
accepted Japan's decision to deploy the minesweepers and
allowed the flotilla to visit Penang . [Ref . 249]
The Indonesian Foreign Minister All Alata made a public
comment that Japan was acting within her rights. [Ref. 250]
Singapore Prime Minister Goh, as stated earlier, voiced public
approval for Japan's decision. [Ref. 251] This sentiment also
extends to future deployment of the SDF . A leading Indonesian
claimed that as long as there is prior notification and
consultation, there would be no problems
raised. [Ref. 252] Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew has
stated that he sees Japan's increased security role in the
region as "inevitable" and that he accepts it as long as the
US/Japan treaty remains in effect. [Ref. 253]
Some recent occurrences demonstrate that both Japan and
ASEAN recognize their future relationship. Prime Minister
Kaifu's trip to the ASEAN nations was highly indicative.
During his policy statement given in Singapore on May 3, 1991
he stated, "Amidst these changing times, I feel acutely that
Japan is expected to make even greater contributions in the
Asia Pacific region - not only in the economic sphere but in
the political sphere as well." [Ref. 254] What PM
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Kaifu was hoping for from his trip through Southeast Asia was
a mandate from ASEAN to adopt a more active role for Japanese
PKO ' s , and to be able to decide the extent to which Japan
could back up its economic role in the region with a security
presence. [Ref. 255] Another example is Mahathir's
invitation to Japan to become the leader of his proposed East
Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) , while suggesting that the EAEG
also embrace security matters. [Ref. 256] Finally,
in August, prior to the beginning of the ASEAN post-
ministerial conference (PMC), Tokyo notified ASEAN that it
intended to propose a framework for the discussion of security
in the region. [Ref. 257]
Southeast Asia is not without its own security problems,
either. Since the end of the Cold War, many thought that a
new era of peace had begun. The Gulf War proved them wrong.
The world is, in some ways, a more unpredictable, dangerous
one. This is especially true in Southeast Asia. The
East/West conflict was not the only conflict in the region.
There are many more. Now that the relatively stable
atmosphere wrought by the fairly predictable and easily
defined Cold War tensions is gone, major changes will take
place. Older conflicts, previously buried by the dynamics of
the Cold War, will soon arise. A later section of this
chapter will serve to illustrate some of these conflicts.
These new tensions will necessitate that the nations of ASEAN
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find a new way to ensure their continued peace and prosperity.
The key to the new way could very well be Japan.
What the remainder of this chapter seeks to suggest is
that Japan may be allowed to assume a far greater military
role in Southeast Asia than she currently holds. Until now,
Japan's role has been purely economic. Should, in the near
future, Japan seeks to expand her actions to encompass both
political and military roles, the nations of Southeast Asia
might permit, even encourage, this change.
However, an unilateral expansion will not be permitted by
regional governments. Memories of Japan's odious conduct
during WWII are very strong. However, within the framework of
the US-Japan security treaty, and if seen as a way of keeping
the US engaged in the region, things could be very different.
The combination of Japan's new found internationalism and her
neighbors' concurrence could bring about resounding change.
However, the people of Southeast Asia must first welcome
Japan's new role. Their thoughts, their writings, and their
actions may reveal if such an welcome is indeed present.
To illustrate the above, this section is organized as
follows: a. identify tensions outside ASEAN; b. outline the





"Change brings with it new opportunities but also many
new uncertainties." [Ref. 258] This Singaporean
quote illustrates the concerns which have emerged since the
end of the Cold War. The new era may have brought peace, but
it also unleashed new competitive forces that could redefine
international stability. One excellent example was brought
out by Singapore's Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew. He
felt that the emergence of three trading blocs, each based on
dollars, deutschmarks , and yen, would mean a world fraught
with conflict. [Ref. 259] In terms of
international security, the passing of the Cold War generated
three kinds of tensions: countries are no longer able to play
one superpower off against the other; superpower entente might
be detrimental to the self interests of middle powers; and the
possible withdrawal of superpowers may provide an "window of
opportunity" for regional powers to become more assertive and
independent . The end of the bipolar world may release other
destabilizing forces that can no longer be managed as they
were in the past
.
This is especially true in the Asia Pacific region.
Within this area, not only are sources of regional disorder
likely to persist, but a vacuum created by superpower
withdrawal could be filled by aspiring regional powers like
Indonesia, Vietnam, China, Japan, or India. The United States
may not always be so friendly, either. Once Asian Pacific
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nations are not regarded as strategic bulwarks, the U.S. may
consider it necessary to take tougher steps with those
countries in order to defend its own interests. Therefore,
ASEAN countries must do things for and by themselves in order
to fill this impending vacuum.
Within Southeast Asia itself, there are several
reasons for a dramatically different security environment
which would supplement superpower military disengagement
should it occur: [Ref. 260]
1. Escape from strife on mainland Southeast Asia is no
longer possible.
2. Japan, despite stated disinterest, when viewed in terms
of her security concerns over sea lanes and declining
American security role, may be compelled to opt for a
security role beyond her adjacent waters





Phenomenal increase of Indian naval strength, with the
desire to play the role of regional power, cannot be
ignored
Thus, ASEAN countries will find it necessary to spend far more
resources on force upgrading and expansion in order for those
forces to play a meaningful national security role once the
stabilizing aspect of the U.S. presence can no longer be taken
for granted. All ASEAN governments are apprehensive of the
unilateral and precipitate thinning out of US military
presence in the region. The uncertain shape of the US presence
following withdrawal of US forces from bases in the
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Philippines, and the impact of those negotiations on other-
powers such as China and Japan, mean that ASEAN itself would
increasingly have to accommodate discussions of security
cooperation issues into its formal agenda. Indeed, this was
finally accepted by ASEAN heads of state at the February 1992
summit meeting in Singapore.
Lastly, if there should be more than one aspirant for
regional domination, a new type of regional rivalry may
develop. A good example may be Smo-India rivalry. Both
countries view Southeast Asia as strategically important for




The first half of this section will deal with those
countries outside the ASEAN organization which are
increasingly viewed as regional powers. The three countries
are: India, China, and Japan.
India, with her vast resources, industrial base,
manpower, territory, and strategic location; has a unique
opportunity to play a major role in the world. Especially
significant is the great increase in her naval strength. Most
of the recent additions have been offensive, power projection
platforms. By the year 2000, India intends to field a naval
force which includes 5-7 nuclear attack submarines and 5-
light aircraft carriers, and has stated the intention to
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overtake British and French navies in world
ranking. [Ref . 261] Although recent budgetary problems appear
to have delayed this process, her intentions must be noted and
considered. Neither India's trade nor presence of overseas
Indians warrants such naval force. Rather, the Indian Navy's
expansion seems to be an offshoot of a larger political
decision to give more muscle to India's foreign policy.
"India perceives itself to be a great power destined to play
a crucial role in international
politics" . [Ref . 262]
Such aims for the future and India's manifest desire
to acquire great power status generates fears and tensions
among Southeast Asian nations and could very well cause
reactions from other powers, such as Japan and China, should
India be perceived to be going beyond its legitimate strategic
interests. India is expected to play a role as a major power.
Its future naval modernization and reach may well reflect an
interest which goes beyond the Indian Ocean. This, when
balanced against her minimal security concerns in Southeast
Asia, and the lack of a major threat (to India) from the
region, gives rise to the concern that something else is
afoot. One Malaysian viewpoint is that the Indian Navy,
utilizing its bases at Nicobar and Andaman islands, is fully
capable of blockading the Malacca Straits, and utilizing Port
Blair as a forward base for South China Sea
operations. [Ref. 263]
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How does Southeast Asia fare in India's security
perception? To India, Southeast Asia is a geographic extension
of South ^sia. Some Indians regard the entire area as a
single strategic entity. Southeast Asia is also seen as
India's access point to the great technological and economic
development of the Asia-Pacific region. Even so, the chances
of India forging a security relationship with ASEAN countries
is slight
.
How do the Southeast Asian nations feel about these
Indian efforts? India's greatly strengthened bases in the
Nicobar and Andaman islands pose a direct threat . Southeast
Asian nations are fraught with internal conflicts resulting
from various ethnic groups, one large group being Indians.
Southeast Asia's proximity may therefore compel India to
utilize gunboat diplomacy to protect its overseas Indians.
G.V.C. Naidu, of the Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis, New Delhi, has collected several quotes from leading
Southeast Asians which illustrate that India is definitely
perceived to be a major threat. His compilation is quoted
below:
Indonesia was more explicit in identifying India in
June, 1989, when at a meeting in New Delhi, Indonesia's
naval chief, Admiral Rakefendo, formally conveyed to the
Indian officials his government's concern over India's
naval expansion. In an interview with Indonesian Times,
Indonesia's former Deputy Prime Minister, Hardy, quoted
Indian strategists who admitted India had the motives and
intentions of expanding influence in Southeast Asia, and
perhaps, to fill the vacuum left by the possibility of
U.S. withdrawal from the Western Pacific region.
According to a Time report, an Indonesian army colonel
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described his government as 'concerned' about India's
longer-term intentions, explaining this to be the main
reason for the Indonesian decision to build a large naval
base on Sumatra that would provide quick access to the Bay
of Bengal. According to former Malaysian Prime Minister,
Ahmad Rithauddeen, India's growing naval capability to
project power well beyond its borders has caused 'some
alarm and concern in East Asia and Western Pacific...
India must show its neighbors, including Malaysia and
other countries in Southeast Asia, that it does not have
any ambitions to interfere in regional affairs.' A
Malaysian defence analyst, J.N. Mak has stated that 'India
is very definitely looming larger on the defence
consciousness of countries in this part of the
world. ' [Ref . 264]
Similarly, China is viewed with increasing concern.
Whether weak, unstable, and factionalized; or united, strong,
and assertive; China, due to her great size, population,
military, and geographic location, will always have a great
deal of impact upon the region. China is proceeding with
military modernization, will soon have significant power
projection capability into Southeast Asia, and is acquiring a
wider, more effective range of conventional capabilities which
would enable her to advance and protect her interests in the
region. China has long regarded the South China Sea as
critical for the following reasons: [Ref. 265]




The perceived quantity of undersea resources to be
exploited
3 . Islands in the area can be used as base points to
delineate a vast Exclusive Economic Zone for China
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China has emerged as the new dominant actor in the South
China Sea, having the most powerful indigenous navy in the
region. To achieve control over the area, China is
strengthening Hainan Island, from which it can project power
more easily into the region. Especially enlightening is a
look at the Chinese Navy. China has various reasons to be
concerned with protecting her maritime interests: to
discourage encroachment of her territorial waters (2/3 of
which are in dispute as China claims most of the South China
Sea); to permit exploitation of sea resources; to protect her
fast growing coastal economy; to facilitate trade; and to
feed her people with ocean
fishing. [Ref. 266] Since the early 1980 ' s , China
has added an open ocean training for her Navy, in preparation
of her Navy's exercise of blue water power in the not too
distant future. China has begun a three phase buildup
program. The first phase, which she is currently undergoing,
includes the following elements: [Ref. 267]
1. extending radius of operations to the first island chains




4. gaining air protection and attack forces
5. achieving credible second strike nuclear deterrence
capability
95
By 2020, China intends upon being a major sea power.
Even now, almost all of the Chinese Navy's recent major-
exercises have been held in the South China Sea. China's 1979
invasion of Vietnamese proved that she was prepared to use
military force as an extension of foreign policy. Because of
such actions, various Southeast Asian academics see China's
claims to the entire South China Sea region as proof of her
intent to become the dominant actor in the
area. [Ref. 268]
Malaysia has a history of conflict with China, and has
always considered her as the greatest long term threat for two
reasons. First, Malaysia's forty year insurgency was
sponsored by Communist Chinese. Beijing has wooed the ethnic
Chinese population in the past, its Communist ideology
incompatible with Malay ideology, and China's "Middle Kingdom"
mentality gives rise to the suspicion that China is
continually seeking to dominate her neighbors. Second, during
the last ten years the Chinese Navy has been considered a
serious direct threat to the South China Sea, especially Malay
interests in the Spratly Islands. Recent events have not
helped much either. The U.S. is seen to be having a "love
affair" with China. The decrease of tension along China's
border with the former Soviet Union has freed the Chinese
military from the danger of imminent attack, leaving it free
to concentrate on the South China Sea. China's 1988 clash
with Vietnam over disputed claims in the Spratly Islands gives
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rise to the worry that Malaysia, with her own claims in the
Spratlys, may also be on the target list.
Indonesia does not fare much better. First, Indonesia
does not agree with the Communist ideology. Second, one of
Indonesia's primary concerns is the large Chinese minority.
China has a history of interference. During the 1950 's and
60 's, culminating in the bloody attempted Communist coup,
increased conflicts between the army and the PKI (Communist
Party of Indonesia) implicated China and overseas Chinese.
The PKI received moral and material support from Beijing, and
acted as champion for overseas Chinese against persecution
from government officials. As such, anti Chinese sentiments
ran high among the indigenous population, and Indonesia froze
diplomatic relations with China in 1967 and did not resume
them until 1991
.
Thailand, which has no interests in the South China
Sea, can afford to take a lighter view. Even so, the Sino-
Thai friendship is one of convenience. Until 1975, Thailand
distrusted China. The seeds of this distrust go back to 1949.
Thailand's overseas Chinese have dominant control of the Thai
economy and play a major role in it's development. Therefore,
to keep Communist China's influence out of Thailand, Thai
government recognized the Kuomintang government in Taiwan.
China retaliated by supporting the Communist Party of Thailand
(CPT) in its attempt to overthrow the Thai government . This
hostility lasted until 1975. At that time, all of Indochina
fell into communist hands, and the Indochinese states became
a direct security threat to Thailand. In order to offset this
growing threat, Thailand established relations with the PRC
.
This was the first stage. In 1988, the Thai armed forces lost
a major battle, Ban Rom Khao, with Laos. Realizing that it
lacked the quantity and quality of weapons to fight a modern
war, Thailand had to revamp its military. Bangkok felt the
U.S. could not be depended upon to safeguard Thailand in
anything short of all out war. Nor could it be a source of
weaponry. U.S. arms were viewed as too expensive, due to both
technology and shipping costs, -and unreliable as weapons
transfers are subject to Congressional approval, and take too
long to get to Thailand. By contrast, Chinese weapons are
cheaper, readily available, and rapidly delivered. Thailand
therefore turned to China for help. For her part, China saw
the opportunity to use Thailand as a channel to get arms to
the Khmer Rouge, and readily agreed; and, at the same time,
agreed to end support of the CPT. There remain some concerns,
though. The end of the Cambodian conflict may change Sino-
Thai relationships. Additionally, China could use its
friendliness with Thailand to force it to not protest Chinese
aggression in the South China Sea, thereby driving a wedge
into ASEAN unity.
The final potential "external" threat is Japan.
Rather than going into specifics of how Japan is resented by
most ASEAN countries for her both WWII atrocities and
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aggressive post-war economic singlemindedness , my purpose here
is to contrast Japan with the other regional powers in terms
of threat perception by the Southeast Asian nations.
Professor Julius Caesar Parrenas, Senior Political
Economist with the Institute for International and Strategic
Studies of the Centre for Research and Communication,
Philippines, has compiled a country by country contrast of
ASEAN perceptions of China and Japan. His findings are
summarized below. [Ref. 269]
Indonesia
The lack of integration of overseas Chinese has
led to their being considered an alien group, and has
spawned tensions between them and the Malay majority.
These tensions have been mixed with the suspicions
prevalent among Islamic and military establishments that
Communist China is making use of overseas Chinese to
influence and dominate Indonesia.
Economic relations play a significant role in
Indonesia's foreign policy, as Indonesia feels that
bolstering its development enhances both internal and
external security. As Indonesia's most important trading
partner, Japan plays a positive role. In contrast, China
is a potential competitor.
Malaysia
Ethnic tensions between politically predominant
Malays and ethnic Chinese contribute to Malaysia's
security concerns. China is seen as a potential
destabilising factor in the region for two reasons;
Beijing's ties with subversives, and perceived influence
over the Malaysian Chinese community. China's claim to a
large portion of the South China Sea poses a direct threat
to Malaysian external security. Despite uneasiness
regarding Japan's WWII activities and growing power,
Japan's role has been largely supportive of regional
stability. Japan is also Malaysia's most important
economic partner, especially in boosting its economy and
defense capability.
The Philippines
China's claims to the South China Sea, including
some strategic islands claimed by the Philippines,
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reinforce Philippine perceptions of China as an external
security threat. More importantly, China's links with the
Philippines' outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines
increase this perception. Japan is viewed in a positive
light because of its large economic role, which is
perceived as contributing to Philippine development.
Singapore
Singapore's small size and dominance of ethnic
Chinese are sources of instability. Even though China is
not a direct threat, the dominance of ethnic Chinese are
a destabilising factor in its relations with its closest
neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia, both of whom view
ethnic Chinese with suspicion.
Hence, Singapore is wary of establishing close
ties with China. Japan has become Singapore's most
important economic partner.
Thailand
Thai perceptions of China depend upon its
triangular relationship with both China and Vietnam.
Although relations are good now, China is a traditional
enemy, and changes in Thai-Vietnamese relations could
easily lead to a change in Sino-Thai relations. China,
due to its size and proximity, is also considered a
potential threat to Thai security. Japan plays a
significant role in Thai development. Additionally,
Thailand does not share other ASEAN countries' negative
views of Japan during WWII, having been allied to Japan at
the time.
Additional emphasis must be placed on Indonesia.
Within ASEAN Thailand, an economic powerhouse, and Indonesia,
the population/size powerhouse, are probably the two most
influential countries. While Thailand has actually supported
Japan's military expansion, as will be outlined in a later
section of this thesis, Indonesia has staunchly maintained
non-alignment. However, should Indonesia have to choose
between China and Japan, Japan will undoubtably be the choice.
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences,
Jakarta, has contrasted the two. [Ref. 270]
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China-represents the type of country Indon wants
to avoid.
China has little to offer to Indones: '. leveJ pment
efforts, and relations with China have proved socially and
politically destabilising. China may also subvert
Indonesian overseas Chinese for its own political ends.
Relations with China have been marked by 'onfn ni it .
Japan-represents the type of country Indonesia wai
to cultivate close relations with. Japan is in a ; . • ion
to help Indonesia out economically and has not played a
political role in the region and has not interfered in
Indonesia's domestic affairs. Japan is ex] ted to
contribute to the development of Indonesia's national
resilience as well as to the regional re; - . nee as a
whole
.
Former Foreign Minister Ali Moertopo, as quoted in the
Anwar article, also compared the two threats. He sees
threat from Japan as stemming from its economic
aggressiveness, and the threat from China as stemming from its
ideological aggressiveness. He argues that while Japai
economic aggressiveness can be channeled into national
development, China's aggressive ideological threat is
unusable, unabsorbable, and quit
unnecessary. [Ref. 271]
In summary, Indonesia is afraid of China, not so much
as a hostile power, but in light of Indonesia'.: ..esses
which China might exploit. In contrast, Indonesia's view of
Japan is one of ambivalence. If forced to choose betw< en the
two, Indonesia will thus likely choose Japan.
The next question to be addressed is how In
compares with Japan in terms of Southeast . ... threat
perception. India, in contrast to Japan, has repeatedly
demonstrated its willingness to use military forc< in tder I
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assume a great power status. [Ref. 272] ASEAN
countries are well aware of the military threat posed by
India. Even Indonesia, the non-alignment state, has beefed up
its defenses in response to a perceived Indian threat .
Concerns about ethnic Indians in ASEAN countries also exist
.
Given the above, one can assume that Japan will also be the
preferred choice in comparison.
The second half of this section will address the
ongoing conflict in the Spratly Islands between ASEAN and non-
ASEAN nations. This conflict is, and will remain, the primary
source of major tensions, rivalries, and military adventurism.
The Spratly Islands, a collection of largely
uninhabited islands spread throughout the South China Sea,
appear to be headed for an era of naval conflict that will
probably involve all ASEAN members. The islands are
important for several reasons; strategic location, abundance
of maritime resources, and possibly large oil/gas
deposits. [Ref. 273] Five countries have claims in the area;
Taiwan, PRC, Vietnam, The Philippines, and Malaysia. Ot those
five, three countries claim the entire archipelago. The
Philippines and Malaysia have claims only on specific islands.
Until 1988, the region was in relative peace despite the
conflicting claims. All involved appeared to be avoiding
armed conflict. First, a historical perspective to illustrate
the region up to 1988. [Ref. 274]
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Taiwan, whose claim dates to the first nt ury
A.D., has incorporated the entire archipela'; Lnt me of





Ten years later, it established ay... : 600
on the largest island, and has maintained chat garrison I
date
.
The PRC has claimed sovereignty over the entire
archipelago since 1949, but did not occupy any islands.
Vietnam, whose claim dates to the eai Ly nin< I •
century, announced its sovereignty over entire
archipelago in 1975. Since then, it ha: militarily
occupied five of the islands.
The Philippines claimed about 60 islands in 1971.
Its argument was that the islands it claimed, the
Kalayaans, were not part of the Spratlys and therefore
belonged to no one. Since 1975, it has maintained troops
on various islands. One island, Pagasa, boast: 180C
meter runway.
Malaysia, as a result of a mapping exercise in
1979, designated eleven atolls as part of her Exclusi
Economic Zone. Three atolls have been oc ipied.
All was relatively peaceful until 1987. At I h it I i
PRC declared that the Spratlys were part of the strategic
border of Hainan Province, and started cond . :t ing naval
exercises in the region. This prompted other nations to take
actions in order to consolidate their holdings. More troops
were dispatched. A conflict started brewing between the PRC
and Vietnam. Vietnam charged the PRC of intrusion, and
occupied more islands. China countered by occ ng islands.
The two sides finally clashed in March, 1988.
China emerged as the victor from that bat tie. S:.
that time, not only have other nations furtl
their claims, but China intensified its activit
of that year, the PRC had established a base in the S] Lys,
maintained its military presence there, and conducted
numerous naval exercises in the region.
103
The Spratlys will continue to remain in conflict for
quite some time. The great controversy lies in the fact
that three nations have claimed the entire archipelago. For
any of these nations to even engage in multilateral talks will
immediately and inadvertently jeopardize their own claims by
recognizing the fact other parties have legitimate claims coo.
The results of this are illustrated by the following quote
from Chang Pao-Min of Lingnan College, Hong
Kong. [Ref. 275]
"Precisely because effective occupation of vast areas of
the archipelago remains a goal for all, and fruitful
negotiation cannot be expected to begin, much less to bear
results, in the near future, all parties, with the
possible exception of Taiwan, are likely to continue to
consolidate their gains in the archipelago and even to
expand their respective areas of control in order to alter
the status quo in their favour. Presumably, their
immediate objective is to establish, as much as possible,
a more or less integrated, delmeable, and, therefore,
defensible line of territorial control, if only to
strengthen their respective bargaining positions at the
negotiating table in the future. Such attempts or
activities, however, are bound to generate tension and
armed conflict between the various contending parties. At
any rate, the contest over occupied islands and the
scramble for still unoccupied islands is likely to
continue and probably intensify in the immediate future.
Although large-scale clashes are not desired by all nor
affordable to any, small skirmishes are bound to occur
from time to time, as one party edges into the perceived
or actual territory of another."
3. Military buildup
The next point to address is whether or not a military
buildup started in the area? If so, how does a buildup fit
in with an unstable security environment? Until now, most of
the nations' militaries have been land focused. Not only are
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ground forces significantly cheaper than maritiiru : , out
domestic stability often takes priority in developing nations.
Ground forces are a critical component in maintaining internal
order. In order to identify a change in thr< ii perception
from internal to external, this section will take a lc
maritime capabilities. A order of battle will
presented. Instead, new trends are the focus here.
Malaysia has recently started to upgrade its maritime
capability. [Ref. 276] She has stated Lterest
in acquiring fast attack patrol craft and up to six
submarines. More ominously, Malaysia has decided to construct
a major naval base in the Sabah district. Combined with the
redeployment of naval assets from the Malacca Straits area to
the South China Sea area, this signifies a shift in threat
perception towards the South China Sea. The Air Force has
also shifted its focus, developing a major air base on
Peninsular Malaysia facing the South China Sea.
Singapore has also undergone a change. ... . .. been
a recent trend in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to
emphasize the readiness to stave off major nav . . : :es
if necessary. [Ref. 277] In March, , SAF
announced that it would be acquiring aircraft specii
intended for maritime patrol and reconnaissan
more of its aircraft are being reconfigured towards an anti-
ship role. Finally, Singapore has equipped some of its
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aircraft with aerial refueling capability, signifying the
perceived need for long range maritime strike.
Indonesia has been previously mentioned to be
strengthening her bases in Sumatra, and Thailand has recently
announced its desire to field a helicopter carrier in the near
future. All of these recent developments signify a major
change in threat perception, from internal disorder to
maritime force.
C. JAPAN'S ROLE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
This final section bring us to a future role for Japan.
The focus of this section is to point out various statements
and gestures made by some leading Southeast Asians which
indicate that Japan may be allowed to pursue a greater role in
the future.
It is important, however, to state that the prospects for
a greater Japanese military role in Southeast Asia are very
slight. Southeast Asians would be vehemently opposed to such
a role, and many have made it perfectly clear that while
economic and political roles for Japan would be highly
welcomed, an expansion in her military role will currently not
be tolerated. This message seems perfectly clear.
What this section will argue is as follows. Should the
ASEAN nations be forced to choose a regional power to maintain
regional stability, there are three choices. Currently,
India, the PRC, and Japan are the only regional nations even
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remotely capable of carrying out such a role. Ea :. :hoice has
its inherent disadvantages. However, of those threi >ptions,
Japan may be the least objectionable. Japan, despite her
history of aggression, has contributed greatly co the (
welfare of Southeast Asia. When contrasted with i hi i her two
nations, Japan has not embarked on any military adventurism in
the last half century has been benign. This is the argument
that this section will seek to synthesize from che writings
and statements of some Southeast Asian opinion leaders.
Admittedly, the following quotes express the vie. : opinion





Tan Sri Mohammed Ghazali Shafie, former Foreign Minister
of Malaysia, has the following to say: [Ref . 278]
"For Japan, this is a unique moment in her history to
seize the opportunity to define a visii n : .. :.rld
political and economic order and assume hei legitimate
role in within that order." "While I appreciate the
Japanese cultural tendency to decline the role of
leadership because of the sense of guilt and shame as a
result of war crimes ... I think Japan and her people must
face the fact that Germany also committed her share of
military atrocities. Yet Germany and her people do not
behave the way Japanese do. Japan must snap out of this
complex..." "Japan receives the esteem of Asia, yet one
detects a reluctance to do more on her part. A: . . is in
need of direction; it is a continent that needs to pool
its resources and do great things together."
Muthiah Alagappa, of the Institute of ' gic and
International Studies, Malaysia, wrote Ln 1988
that: [Ref. 279]
"...a Japanese military role in the regie:, is, foj the
moment, not necessary and, for many, not de: Le. In
the long term, however, a Japanese security role in the
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region may have to be considered, especially by the ASEAN
countries, due to the eventuality of a substantial
reduction of the U.S. presence in the region as well as
the continued Soviet and possibly also Chinese military
presence .
"
Malaysia's Mahathir, in early 1991, accepted Japan's
decision to deploy minesweepers to the Persian Gulf and
allowed the flotilla to visit Penang . [Ref. 280]
He also invited Japan to become the leader of his proposed
East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG, now EAEC) and suggested
that the EAEG also embrace security matters. [Ref. 281]
Indonesia
:
Jusef Wanandi , Chairman of the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Indonesia, feels that Japan cannot be
trusted if the U.S. -Japan alliance is broken. Even so, as
long as the alliance is maintained:
"it would be in the best interests of the ASEAN countries
to have Japan... take part in the collective security
efforts of the U.N. Security Council." "In the event that
the ASEAN members agree to establish some sort of
collective security arrangement for the purpose of
maintaining peace and stability in the Southeast Asian
region, it would be desirable to invite Japan to
contribute to the setup." [Ref. 282]
Dewi Fortuna Anwar, of the Centre for Political and
Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, feels that
while many of the apprehensions and concerned voiced are from
civilians, important military leaders feel that Indonesia had
nothing to fear from an increase in Japan's non-economic role
(emphasis mine) in the region. In fact, there is a feeling
that Japan should play a more active role in maintaining order
and stability in the region. He has also compiled the views
of several officials to that effect, two of which will be
outlined below.
Former Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces Soemitro felt
that Japan, in the future, must accept the fact that it is
also a major power with political responsibility to
preserve peace and stability. He also feels that Japan
could never be a threat unless Indonesia and other
countries in the region tried to prevent Japan from using
the sea lanes. Lt . Gen Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, former
ambassador to Japan, argues that an increase in Japan's
military might deter China's military ambition in the
South. At the same time, Japan's economic dependence on
imports would stem aggressiveness as gunboat diplomacy can
no longer be used. Gen Sayidiman is so confident of this
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that in 1983, he made the following statement in Japan:
"As long as relations with ASEAN are smooth, A ild
not be threatened even if Self Defense Fgj need
into sea areas close to Southeast Asia and even if they
undertook escort operations for U.S. carrier: . I her or
not the strengthening of Japan's self defense power will
pose a threat to ASEAN depends ultimately upon whether or
not relations between Japan and ASEAN are
stable." [Ref. 283]
Indonesia has expressed a desire for joint military
exercises with Japan as early as 1971, when joint air
exercise was proposed between Indonesian and Japanese air
forces. [Ref. 284] Although how Japanese ] Lanes
were supposed to get to Indonesia was never addressed as Japan
immediately declined, the gesture is still significant .
Singapore
:
Prime Minster Goh voiced public approval for Japan's
decision to deploy her minesweepers, and extended this
approval to future deployments of Japan's Self Defense
Forces. [Ref. 285] Former Prime MinisterL e e u a n
Yew has stated that he sees Japan's increased security role as
inevitable and that he accepts it as long as the US/Japan
treaty is in effect. [Ref. 286] Singapore already
sends officers to military schools in Japan.
Thailand
:
Thailand is an outright advocate of an increased military
role for Japan. She has shown an interest in receiving arms
and military technology from Japan and already sends officers
to military schools in Japan, [Ref. 287 and
encouraged an increased military role for Japan as early as
1981. Surachai Sirikai, Dean of Faculty of Political Science,
Thammasat University, Bangkok, states that Thai. .:. I and
Japan's good relations extend back 600 years. Thai leaders
view Japan's defense build up and a possible security role
Southeast Asia as contributing to region -
stability, [Ref. 288] and Thai elites various
quarters see an increase in Japan's security re tble
in view of the decreasing U.S.
Thailand feels safe as long as Japan continue: Li Lliance
with the US. He states that Thailand's support oi an ase
in both military strength and security role fc ted
in the 1980's, when Thailand felt threatened b; t names
e
intrusion, and has compiled the following to prove this point:
"For example, in September 1980, former Foreign
Minister Bhichai Rattakui suggested that Japan should
rearm in order to have an effective political role. In
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January 1981, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi Savetsila told
Japanese Prime Minister Suzuki during his visit to ASEAN
that Thailand did not fear the military resurgence of
Japan and would welcome a Japanese security role in Asia.
In November 1981
;
Prime Minister Prern Tmsulanonda
expressed the opinion that Japan should play an active
role to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia. In
May, 1983, Prem again lauded Nakasone's decision to expand
the Self-Defence Forces and to patrol Japanese sea lanes
up to a 1 , 000-nautical mile perimeter from Tokyo Bay, as
a contribution to peace and stability in East
Asia" [Ref. 290]
This trend has continued to date. In mid 1990, then Prime
Minister Chatichai Choonhavan proposed a joint Thailand Japan
naval exercise in Southeast Asian waters. [Ref. 291] Although
the recent coup may have changed the country's leadership,
the trend outlined above may not change.
The Philippines:
This country has emerged as the most recent advocate of a
increased role for Japan. This is doubly significant in that
the Philippines suffered more at the hands of the Japanese
than other ASEAN nations. Secretary of Defense Ramos,
visiting Japan in April of 1991, urged Japan to provide
Southeast Asia with military technology. "We do not have any
unusual fears about the ... alleged growing militarization of
Japan" was his comment to the Foreign Correspondents club of
Japan. [Ref. 292] He also hinted at defense
arrangements between Japan and the Philippines, and that Japan
should take a step by step approach to improving its defense
relations with other Southeast Asian countries. At a meeting
with the Director of the Japanese Defense Agency, he again
suggested that Japan enter into more formalized security
arrangements with the Philippines. [Ref. 293] To
emphasize the point, Mr Ramos is a strong candidate for the
1992 Presidential elections.
One theme emerges from the above compilation. Japan is
not regarded as a threat as long as the US/Japan Security
Treaty is in effect. This ties in with the aims of the
Internationalist school, whose proponents all stress the
importance of the treaty.
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D. ARGUMENT AND COUNTERARGUMENT
A development occurred in July of 19 91 .., n the
surface, would seem to break apart the theme of this paper.
Japan's Foreign Minister, led on by perceived calls from ASEAN
for Japan to increase her security role, proposed at I . e July
Post-Ministerial Meeting that the association and its dialogue
partners establish annual and formalized discu: .... at the
senior official level on regional security issue: . .•'.. . : the
ASEAN countries responded with hesitancy. The overall
reaction was to acknowledge that security is a valid concern,
but senior officials should not be discussing security
matters. Japan had responded to ASEAN requests, only to find
she was no longer wanted.
At first, it would appear that a security role was not
desired. However, ASEAN nations have long avoided discussing
security relationships among themselves, and it wa: not until
the Singapore summit of February 1992 that a security dialogue
was started.
Until the 1991 summit, ASEAN leaders resisted an ASEAN
-
wide alliance as it could intensify ideolog: I .sed
polarization, conflicts within Southeast Asia, encourage the
major powers to intervene, and . I AS]
flexibility. [Ref. 294] Region-wide d. :ns
concerning security have just started with the Februa]
summit. To date, even minimal regional defer) /ooperation,
such as the standardization of weapons and regional s< Li
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sufficiency in arms production, has not worked. It has not
worked because of regional arms races, interservice rivalry,
differing threat perceptions, various levels of defense
spending, and different strategic priorities of each country
based on location, territorial depth, and military
doctrine. [Ref. 295] A maximum approach, a
"defense community", is unlikely for several
reasons. [Ref. 296] Each nation has a different
perception of those countries which could become threats.
Each nation is more comfortable in trusting its security to
its ties with its external sponsor. Finally, for any ASEAN
alliance to be effective, the alliance itself must be allied
with a superpower, which will be contrary to ZOPFAN. Only the
emergence of a significant, common external threat will force
the ASEAN nations to ally among themselves.
This trend appears to be changing direction. The
Singapore Summit of February 1992 heralded the start of
security discussions at the region-wide level. In reality,
Japan may have acted too hastily in 1991. In order to gain a
military security role in the region, Japan must proceed
slowly and cautiously. Bilateral ties with specific nations
will most likely increase tensions and may even divide ASEAN.
A mutually beneficial policy to follow would be to persuade
certain ASEAN nations to invite Japan into the fold. Thailand
and the Philippines may be the best places to start . They
have openly expressed a desire for Japan to increase her
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security role. If Japan allows those countries tc y the
groundwork for a greater Japanese security role in th . ..,
international and inter-regional criticism mighl I - minimized.
However, it is important for Japan to maint i its
relationship with the U.S. This is the critical legit lrnizin
factor that reassures the ASEAN countries that Japan's
intentions are good. Without that qualifier, Japan cannot
hope to expand her role.
E. CONCLUSION
As indicated in this thesis, the Southeast Asia region is
by no means a safer region due to the demise of the cold War.
It may very well be a more dangerous region. Sou] :es of
tension are everywhere, and militaries in the region are
increasing their capabilities. Of the three major region
powers, Japan has favorable relations with all : the
countries. Should the need arise for some other Asa .:. : ..• i
to fill the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal, .7.; .:. wi
likely be seen as the best contender, or least
obj ectionable
.
Japan will probably seek to extend her influence
region. A new foreign policy generation in i, the
Internationalist, is already demanding a new, iter role for
Japan. When Tokyo decides to become fully i I, Soul .. .. I
Asia will be her primary area of interest. Ja] in ah -as
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extensive economic penetration into the region. A military
role cannot be too far behind.
It is important, however, to point out that most of the
changes, notably the cessation of the Cold War, are relatively
new, happening only within the past several years. Therefore,
this conclusion is inherently speculative in nature. The
focus is more upon possibilities, rather than definite events
or actions. As the United States is highly involved and
interested in both Southeast Asia and Japan, it is important
to realize that these possibilities exist. Change will
provide both opportunities and problems for the U.S., and it
is extremely important not to be caught off guard.
114
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
A. THE US PERSPECTIVE
The purpose of this last chapter is to e>: t he U.S.
view of Japan's role in maintaining security and st ») . Lity in
the Pacific region. The key word is "burden sharing."
Currently, the United States maintains a very strong presence
in Japan. The general American perception is that Japan is
getting a "free ride" from the U.S. in terms of her
defense. This has enabled her to become the economic
superpower that she is, and has contributed significantly to
the decline of the US economy. Many argue that Japan should
take a military role commensurate to her economic status, and
take an active role in today's multipolar world, both
militarily and economically. An ideal solution, from the US
perspective, is that Japan should assume most, but not all, of
the responsibility for maintaining security and stability in
the Northeast Asian area. This can be accomplished by-
extending her SLOC (Sea Lines of Communication I : ense to the
Formosa and Luzon Straits in the southwest, and significantly
further along the trans-Pacific SLOC's. In addition tc
assuming a military role as would befit her ecc -us,
the additional "share" would enable US forces to son
reduce its presence in Japan and assume a less active
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peacetime role. Furthermore, US forces could then easily
respond to contingencies not only in Northeast Asia, but in
distant theaters without the need for maintaining a
substantial presence in the Northeast Asia region.
It has been stated by many political and academic leaders
that "the U.S. has no single relationship more important than
our ties with Japan." [Ref. 297] Even Karel van
Wolferen, one of Japan's "Gang of Four" ( a name coined by
leading Japanese to indicate four of the most prominent "Japan
basher" writers) [Ref. 298] states that the United
States' relationship with Japan is "beyond question among the
most strategically important in the world." [Ref. 299] During
the course of the last two years, the bilateral US-Japan
relationship has come under severe scrutiny and become the
focus of high level debates in both countries. This highly
confrontational debate can be characterized by one word:
trade. The issue of trade differences is nothing new. It has
been around for two decades, since the textiles issue in
1960's. [Ref. 300] A significant change that
emerged in most recent years is that of linkage politics;
i.e. the joining of otherwise unrelated issues for bargaining
purposes. [Ref. 301] Until the summer of 1987, the
U.S. administration was firmly against the linkage of security
and trade. The combination of the ongoing controversy of
Japan's next generation experimental support fighter (FSX) and
the relevation of Toshiba's sale of advanced propeller milling
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machinery to the USSR forced the Reagan Administrat - o tie
the two issues together. [Ref. 302] ng
1989, the prevailing view in the US government s that
America's national security ultimately depends on it n mic
and industrial strength. [Ref. 303] Thi
evidenced by the entrance of non-Departme: I of Defense
agencies into the process of national security policy making,
namely the Department of Commerce and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative. [Ref. 304] "Japan-bashing"
soon dominated the arena of bilateral relations.
This trend has continued to this day. Even in trie light
of Japan's monetary contributions to the Persian Gulf War,
many Americans still tend to view the Japanese as free-riders
as far as defense goes. [Ref. 305] In recent
polls, 30% of the American respondents stated that they lost
respect for Japan because of its behavior Ln the Gulf
crisis. [Ref. 306] 73% thought that Jai got av.
without contributing its fair share. [Ref. 3 7]
Numerous Japan-related bills and resolutions, o: :h three
specifically dealt with her role in the gull war, •./ere
submitted to Congress during the Gulf Crisis
timeframe. [Ref. 308]
In order to maintain "desired" US-Japan relationships, it
is crucial that Japan make a move to become a " >r partner"
of the US. Failure to do so can only result in a continuation
of the current trend of Japan bashing and reciproc i erica
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bashing. This may ultimately lead to a break between the two
countries. The economic question has been the focus of many
books and journals. This chapter addresses itself primarily
to the question of security, but economic benefits which could
result will also be outlined.
Is it in the best interests of the US to have Japan assume
all of the responsibility for maintaining stability in the
region? After all, the U.S. spends anywhere between 36-50
billion dollars annually for that
purpose. [Ref . 309] The answer is NO. Japan
already enjoys economic preeminence in East and Southeast
Asia. This area, formerly noted for its chronic war and
economic backwardness, is now one of the world's economically
most dynamic and stable areas (with the exception of
Indochina) . The US might soon lose the powerful position of
the area's protector and benefactor. The countries in the
area are currently more concerned with economic progress than
military threats. [Ref. 310] The economic rewards
from Asia, which includes the NIC ' s (Newly Industrializing
countries) are phenomenal for whoever can control the area.
The power in control is starting to become Japan. In 1976,
then Prime Minister of Japan Takeo Fukuda pledged that Japan
would expand its economic, political, and cultural ties with
the ASEAN countries. He then pledged $1 billion in aid for the
five ASEAN countries. Japan thereby replaced the US as the
largest aid donor to Asia. [Ref. 311] By 1989,
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Japan's influence in Southeast Asia has grown to the point its
influence is starting to replace that of the U.S. :e , for
example, the following comment from Asian Survey magazine's
1989 review issue:
The political reality is that as Japanese spen foi
investment and aid has grown in Asia and that of the U.S.
has shrunk, both relatively (for investment and
absolutely (for aid), Japan's importance and influence has
continued to grow in Asia, even in the ASEAN countries and
South Korea which are uneasy abo n the
trend. [Ref. 312]
Another good example of Japan's increasing influence is
the 1991 coup in Thailand. The US immediately stopped $16.4
million of economic aid. Japan continued $614 rn rth
of economic aid. [Ref. 313] Which side wa: more
influential?
US influence is still formidable. Japan has received
quite a shock from the Gulf War. Fashionable post-Cold-War
thinking had it that economic power was paramount, and Japan
would be transformed into a new superpower, rivalling the US
for influence. [Ref. 314] The Gulf War has proven
that military power still counts in the post -Cold-'.,
era. [Ref. 315] Military power is the US : rte.
This does not mean that the US should start bran li: hing its
firepower all over the world. Legitimacy count videnced
by the importance of the Gulf War cc ilit .on.
[Ref. 316]
However, economic power still wields considerable
influence. To have Japan assume an "enhanced" milit
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presence in Asia concurrent with her economic preeminence
would be disastrous for the U.S. in terms of US influence over
other countries. The U.S. would be "left out." The ideal
solution would be to balance the influence of the two
countries in a mutually satisfactory manner.
As outlined in an earlier chapter, although Japan may be
allowed a larger role in protection of the region and the
SLOC's leading to the area, this will be allowed only within
the confines of the US alliance. Additionally, this role
cannot lead to Japan building a massive war
machine. [Ref. 317] These two restrictions will
serve to effect a balance of influence.
Northeast Asia poses some further problems. Especially
nervous are Japan's closest neighbors of China and Korea.
Their response to Japan's debate about sending seven C-130
aircraft and support personnel to help airlift refugees in the
Gulf region is highly indicative of the historical animosity
in Northeast Asia. Despite being the recipient of massive
investment from Japan, comments from China and South Korea
bordered on hysterical, with China stating that Japan's
proposal was a hidden effort to nullify its
Constitution. [Ref. 318] A renewed sense of threat from Japan
might possibly stimulate an arms buildup, not only in these
two countries, but throughout East Asia. [Ref. 319]
The US/Japan alliance is what dispels the concern of Asian
security, and the concern that Japan would fill the power
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"vacuum" if the US withdrew. [Ref. 320] tralia
and New Zealand are also worried about Japan's military
capability. They both acknowledge the validity of sea lane
defense, but would object to Japan gaining nuclear or long
range bombing capability. [Ref. 321] Ja; itself
is conscious of these worries. As Japan's Polit ... Minster
to the US has stated: "Japan has the same ne* my other
country to build up defense capabilities to protect its own
territory. In doing so, however, it must nor ignore the
sensibilities of the surrounding Asian countries." [Ref. 322]
SLOC defense is Japan's key rationale for a greater
security role. The other nations recognize the importance of
the SLOC'S, and Japan's interests in defending them. That
would be the rationale for increasing Japan's defense
capabilities. At the same time, Japanese force will not be
permitted to either displace or overpower a US presence. The
US must remain as a balancer in the region.
B. A "US" ROLE FOR JAPAN?
What, then, are the steps Japan could tak<
her security role in the region, but only to *
will be permitted by her neighbors? The mail, i - .ced
by the internationalists, that of complementing th much
as possible, would be one solution. There are some immed-
economic benefits to be gained for the US. Most of the
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additional hardware required is of US manufacture. The US
also wants to tap into Japanese high
technology. [Ref. 323] Continued integration with
US forces would provide a rationale to allow the US to
maintain bases in Japan. In a location where the US would be
willing to pay for costs of stationing forces due co the
strategic importance of the region, the Japanese pay most of
the yen-based costs. In 1991, Japan contributed $2.3 billion
towards the cost of stationing U.S. forces by absorbing
facilities cost and a percentage of labor
cost. [Ref. 324]
The important thing that must be stated is that there will
be no significant reductions on the US costs of its presence
in Japan. The US presence in Japan is largely designed to
maintain strategically located bases in that area of the
Pacific, and a stronger Japanese defense will not reduce US
desire to maintain its presence. However, a stronger Japan
will contribute significantly to the stability of the region
by increasing the flexibility of US forces, which is important
to strategic mobility. [Ref. 325]
In turn, the US must accept its loss of absolute power and
pursue a realistic reapportionment of responsibilities for
regional security and prosperity. [Ref. 326] A
combination of the America's still considerable strength,
leadership experience and the economic vigor of Japan could
dominate any threat in the region. [Ref. 327]
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C. CONCLUSION
Will Japan do it? Given the right condition:
,
Japan will
seek to increase her regional security role. The second
chapter of this thesis brought up two trend:; in Japanese
security policy, both of which will be addressed here.
First, Japan's security policy debate is re: her
security environment. Japan's international environment
continues to be harsh. [Ref. 328] The softening of
East/West relations has not had as great an impact in Japan.
The former Soviet fleet has continued to be an impressive
array of hardware located close to Japan's shores. Russian
policies and intentions remain largely unknown, further
contributing to uncertainty in Japan's security calculations.
Tensions remain high in the Korean Peninsula, and may reach a
breaking point during Kim II Sung ' s succession. Japan still
depends heavily on her SLOC's. India continues to ex: .. ] its
navy far beyond what is seen as required, and most or Japan's
oil flows just off India's southern ti; . [Ref. 329]
China has recently reinstated her claim over the Senkaku
Islands, which were the focus of a dispute between in and
Japan in 1990. [Ref. 330] China is also showing interest in
purchasing an aircraft carrier from
Russia. [Ref. 331]
Second, increasingly the Japanese discus. ... : kyo's
greater security role stresses greater indepen . ..apter
III has shown that there is a growing perception that Japan,
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as an economic power, must not only provide for her own
defense, but also share a role in maintaining stability in the
region. Increasing nationalism has promoted a desire for
military strength. Most importantly, the increasing economic-
friction between Japan and the US has made the development of
a more operational military alliance crucial to maintaining
stable and friendly relations between the US and Japan.
Chapter IV outlines one possible means, a regional
security role in Southeast Asia, which could be utilized by
Japan to realize her greater role. However, the underlying
condition which must be met is that Japan maintain her
security relationship with the US. Without this legitimizing
factor, Japan's neighbors will not permit any significant
expansion of Japan's regional security role.
The key to Japan's future security role may well lie with
the Internationalists. Their idea of Japan's future security
policy is one of greater independence and regional scope, and
which goes beyond UN sanctioned PKOs, but which retains the
US/Japan Security Treaty as a essential component. Their
policy framework matches the above conditions. Granted, the
Internationalists themselves acknowledge the difficulties of
promulgating their views. When asked how the
Internationalists might take the reins of power in Japan, Dr.
Sato replied that the only way is through an increased
understanding (on the part of the Japanese people) of the rest
of the world. [Ref. 332] Another traumatic event
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like the Persian Gulf War might prompt an imme nge.
Even without such an catastrophe, recent wo. - nt
served to slowly awaken the Japanese. His prediction is that
within five years, Japan will be more actively engaged in
international security affairs, particularly th se afi
its regional neighbors. [Ref. 333]
Remarks of MP Tsutomu Kawara, former Director General of
the Japan Defense Agency, and said by Internationalists to be
an internationalist politician, [Ref. 334] are
indicative of this probability.
Japan has a great international responsibility. The
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